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NOTES
Administrative Law-Bias-"No man shall judge his own cause"
"[W]hile '[a]n overspeaking judge is no well tuned cymbal' neither
is an amorphous dummy unspotted by human emotions a becoming re-
ceptacle for judicial power."1 These dissenting words of Mr. Justice
McReynolds in Berger v. United States,2 a classic in the field of judicial
bias, vividly disclose the reality of, and perhaps the need for, some degree
of bias on the part of any officer presiding at adjudicatory proceedings.3
Whether such bias violates the due process clause of the fifth amendment,
however, depends upon both type and degree. Generally four types of bias
are recognized in the field of administrative law :
(a) a preconceived point of view regarding issues of law or policy;
(b) factual preconceptions concerning the parties in particular litiga-
gation;
(c) partiality or personal prejudice;
(d) identifiable interest.
A mere policy bias on the part of an administrative agency is usually
considered within the bounds of due process. "While it is essential to
due process of law in the usual judicial proceeding that the judge shall
be disinterested and impartial, it is not essential to due process that an
administrative officer shall be disinterested and impartial. ' 5 However,
the historical precedent that one with a personal stake in a controversy
should be deemed disqualified dates back to 1610 with the rule set forth
in Dr. Bonhavi's Case6 that "no man shall be a judge in his own cause. "7
This concept was applied in Tumey v. Ohio.8 The Court held a statute
'Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 43 (1921).
2255 U.S. 22 (1921). A trial judge in a prosecution for espionage after World
War I had refused to disqualify himself though admittedly prejudiced against
German-Americans. The Supreme Court held him disqualified to judge fairly and
impartially.
'This view is not altogether unsupported by the judiciary. See generally B.
CARnozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168-173 (1921); Holmes, The
Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457 (1897).
'2 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 12.01-12.03 (1958).
De Pauw Univ. v. Brund, 53 F.2d 647, 651 (W.D. Mo. 1931), aff'd on other
grounds, 285 U.S. 527 (1932).
'77 Eng. Rep. 638 (K.B. 1610).71d. at 642.
- 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
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violative of due process, for it conferred upon the judge of a prohibition-
era mayor's court authority to retain for himself only those costs levied
against convicted parties. The Court stated: "That officers acting in a
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity are disqualified by their interest in the
controversy to be decided is, of course, the general rule .... Nice ques-
tions, however, often arise as to what the degree or nature of the inter-
est must be."'
Recently, in Garvey v. Freeman,'° the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
summarily rejected an attack on the integrity of a rather bizarre com-
modity allotment scheme developed under the Agricultural Adjustment
Act."1 "Community Committees" elected by the voluntary participants in
the 1965 federal wheat program determine the apportionment of the area's
gross support allotment based upon an appraisal of the neighbors' farms'
potential yield. Often, as in Garvey, small farmer representation pre-
dominates. A farmer's potential yield determines the issuance to him
of marketing certificates upon which the subsidies are actually paid, and
the cumulative sum of these yields as determined by the committee must
total the "normal yield" for the county as set by the Secretary of Agri-
culture. Appeal from the determination of the Community Committee
is to the County Committee, then the State Committee, with final deter-
mination resting with a designated Deputy Administrator of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture.
Garvey, a large Colorado wheat grower, sought judicial review of
subnormal yield quotas established for his five Kiowa County farms
by the local Community Committee. For 1965, the Secretary had deter-
mined the Kiowa County normal per acre yield to be 19.5 bushels, one
less than the 1964 appraisal. Yet the appraised yield on the Garvey Farms
as found by the Community Committee was 18.6 bushels for 1964, and
this was lowered in 1965 to an estimated average normal yield of 17.26
bushels per acre on the entire area of Garvey Farms-an appraisal 2.24
bushels per acre less than the countywide average. Garvey's request for
redetermination was denied by the County Committee, and this denial
was affirmed by the State Committee, stating that the "yields correctly
reflected Garvey's productivity in relation to yields established for other
similar farms."' 2 While the State Committee twice visited Garvey Farms,
SId. at 522.
10397 F.2d 600 (10th Cir. 1968).
1152 Stat. §§ 101-518 (1938), as amended 7 U.S.C. §§ 1281-1393 (1964).
12397 F.2d at 608.
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it failed to visit neighboring farms to which the Garvey production was
being compared. Of course the benefit of the subnormal evaluation of
Garvey Farm's efficiency inured directly to the benefit of all other Kiowa
County farmers, including every member of the Community and County
Committees. The court of appeals, though recognizing the probability of
bias, dismissed the question:
It may well be that the County Committeemen and even the State
Committeemen harbored a small farmer's prejudice against a big farmer
and that this was reflected in their ultimate decisions. But, we cannot
subjectively judge the minds of these committeemen or impugn their
good intentions .... 13
Precedent supporting the doctrine of disqualification by reason of in-
terest and defining its scope is varied in time, territory, and subject matter.
The two cases possibly most related to the Garvey situation are State Board
of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners14 and Johnson v. Michigan Milk
Marketing Board." In State Board of Dry Cleaners the California Su-
preme Court held unconstitutional a state statute creating a State Board
of Dry Cleaners that was composed of six members of the dry cleaning
industry and one member of the public and was empowered to fix prices
and determine regulatory matters. In holding that the price-fixing pro-
visions were unrelated to the public health, safety, morals or general wel-
fare, the court went on to say that "[w] here the legislature attempts to
delegate its powers to an administrative board made up of interested
members of the industry, the majority of which can initiate regulatory
action by the board in that industry, that delegation may well be brought
into question."-6 In Johnson the Michigan Supreme Court held that a
majority of the members of the Milk Marketing Board, as producers and
distributors, had a pecuniary interest in price-setting. This was held an
unconstitutional denial of due process because matters submitted to the
board could not be considered fairly.' 7
The issue in these and similar cases seems twofold. First, can the
state validly regulate this industry or area of commerce in the exercise of
its police power? Second, can such regulation be carried out by a board of
28 Id. at 612.2'40 Cal. 2d 436, 254 P.2d 29 (1953).
"295 Mich. 644, 295 N.W. 346 (1940).
20 40 Cal. 2d at 449, 254 P.2d at 36.
"See Note, 54 HARv. L. REv. 872 (1940); Note, 89 U. PENN. L. Rlv. 977(1941).
199
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interested members of the industry being regulated? North Carolina in
the past has settled problems of interest of members of licensing boards,
who under the subterfuge of public purpose were in a position to protect
private interests and gain a monopoly over the occupation, by answering
the first question in the negative, at least in the areas of tile contracting,18
dry cleaning, 9 and photography.2 ° Yet, the majority of all occupational
licensing boards in North Carolina are composed of from three to five
members, many, and sometimes all, of whom are required to be licensed
members of the profession.2 ' The interest of members of the various
boards would generally be considered too remote to disqualify them from
quasi-judicial functions. 2  Under the Michigan or California rule, how-
ever, delegation of such power to interested members of the occupation
or industry "may well be brought into question.' ' 23 Due process may
require that our courts and administrative tribunals be not only virtuous,
but also above suspicion.
Though the situation of Garvey is similar to Johnson and State
Board of Dry Cleaners, the degree of pecuniary interest is far greater in
Garvey due to the peculiar local nature of the control of the Community
and County Committees. Garvey presents a situation in which the interest
is perhaps as direct and substantial as in the zoning situations, in which
courts generally disqualify members of zoning boards from voting on
the re-classification of sections of real property when the member owns
property within the district under consideration.2 4 The same is true con-
cerning drainage ditch25 and condemnation proceedings.2 " In Snipes v.
18 Roller v. Allan, 245 N.C. 516, 96 S.E.2d 851 (1957).
1" State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940).
20 State v. Ballance, 229 N.C. 764, 51 S.E.2d 731 (1949).
" See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 86-6 (barbers), § 88-13 (cosmetic art), § 89-4
(engineers), §§ 90-2 & 90-9 (physicians), § 90-22 (dentists), § 90-55 (pharmacists),
§ 90-116 (optometrists), § 90-130 (osteopaths), § 90-139 (chiropractors), § 90-180(veterinarians), § 90-190 (chiropodists), § 90-203 (embalmers and funeral direc-
tors), § 90-238 (opticians), § 93-12 (certified public accountants), and § 93A-3(real estate brokers) (1965).
" See State v. Warren, 252 N.C. 690, 114 S.E.2d 660 (1960).
'" State Bd. of Dry Cleaners v. Thrift-D-Lux Cleaners, 40 Cal. 2d 436, 449, 254
P.2d 29, 36 (1953).
"'See Low v. Town of Madison, 135 Conn. 1, 60 A.2d 774 (1948) ; S&L Assoc.
v. Township of Washington, 35 N.J. 224, 172 A.2d 657 (1961); Piggot v. Borough
of Hopewell, 22 N.J. Super. 106, 91 A.2d 667 (1952).
" See Commissioners of Union Drainage Dist. No. 1 v. Smith, 233 11. 417, 84
N.E. 376 (1908); Stahl v. Board of Sup'rs of Ringgold County, 187 Iowa 1342,
175 N.W. 772 (1920); Jacobson v. Kanderjohi County, 234 Minn. 296, 48
N.W.2d 441 (1951).
" Eways v. Reading Parking Auth., 385 Pa. 592, 124 A.2d 92 (1956).
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City of Winston,2 7 the North Carolina Supreme Court 'held "that the
election by the board of aldermen of one of its own members as "Street
Boss," an office with pay, at a meeting in which he was present and par-
ticipating, was against public policy.2" In Kendall v: Stafford,29 the court
refused to allow members of the county commissioners to raise their own
salaries for reason of interest. The court said that the fixing of salaries
should be left to popular vote.
The power of Congress to set up price control, parity and marketing
programs in the area of wheat production is clear. Similarly, it is for
Congress and the Department of Agriculture to establish the most efficient
and workable administrative hierarchy and procedural rules to deter-
mine the individual rights of program members. Within this broad scope
of Congressional power there exist certain limits, one created by the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. Certainly a farmer is entitled to
a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity determining adjudicative facts that will establish the farmer's
share of the community or county allotment. In the context of -the Garvey
decision, it is at least arguable that the degree of interest held by the
committee members should be grounds for disqualification under general
administrative law concepts. The entire situation appears to be one in
which, by the mere process of elimination in determining the normal yield
of each individual farmer in the community, each member of the com-
mittee will in fact determine "his own cause."
DONALD W. STEPHENS
Admiralty-Obligations of Shipowners to Stevedore Contractors for
Injuries to Longshoremen
If any boatman or young man of the beach shall undertake to
load or unload any ship or vessel by the job or for a lump sum, they
are bound to load and unload her well and diligently, and as quickly
as they can.... And if... the boatman or young man abovesaid have
to incur any expense or sustain any loss, the said merchants or the
managing owner of the ship or vessel for the merchants is bound to
" 126 N.C. 374, 35 S.E. 610 (1900).
"8 For a similar case, see State v. Thompson, 193 Tenn. 395, 246 S.W.2d 59
(1952).
" 178 N.C. 461, 101 S.E. 15 (1919).
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reimburse and to pay all that expense or loss or damage, which they
shall have sustained through their fault.
-Medieval Spanish Sea Code'
The above quoted portion from Les Costumes do la Mar is remark-
ably current in its approach to the theoretical legal relationship between
shipowners and those persons charged with the loading and unloading
of their ships. In those more simplistic times, however, there were no
stevedore contractors as we know them today. The modern longshoreman
is employed by the stevedore, who, in turn, negotiates directly with the
shipowner, and is placed in control of the ship until the work of load-
ing or unloading the cargo is completed. Injuries to longshoremen, when
they do occur, may be caused by some defect on board the ship for which
the shipowner may be liable, or injuries may be caused by conduct on the
part of the stevedore-employer. Since the longshoreman works on the
shipowner's vessel while it is under the control of the employing stevedore,
both the stevedore and the shipowner are potentially liable, and litigation
growing from such injury results in a confusing "multi-party Donny-
brook Fair."2 The law concerning the relative duties and liabilities of
the shipowner and stevedore is so complex because of this unique three-
sided litigation, that the simplistic formula of the medieval Spanish
mariners may have become a lost vision.
While on board the shipowner's vessel, and thence on navigable waters,
the longshoreman's relationship with his stevedore-employer is governed
by the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.' The.
act is essentially a workmen's compensation statute designed to provide
relief for the longshoreman injured in the course of his employment, or
to provide payments to designated survivors in case of death. Compensa-
tion is paid irrespective of fault,4 and is exclusive, according to the statute,
as to the employing stevedore.5 The Longshoremen's Act does not, how-
ever, limit the rights of the longshoreman or his representative against
ILES COSTUMES DO LA MAR (THE CUSTOMS OF THE SEA) ch. cliv, as found in
THE BLACK BOOK OF ADMIRALTY, Append. III. This English translation is from
55 RERUm BRITANNICARUM MEDII 2EVI SCRIPTORES (CHRONICLES AND MEMORIALS
OF GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND DURING THE MIDDLE AGES) 281 (1965).
'Proudfoot, "The Tar Baby": Martime Personal-Injury Indemnity Actions, 20
STAN. L. REv. 423 (1968).
3 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-50 (1964).
4Id. § 904.
'Id. § 905. But the Court has refused to apply the exclusiveness provision when
the employer is the owner of the ship on which the long-shoreman is injured.
Jackson v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 386 U.S. 731 (1967).
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third persons, although acceptance of compensation by the longshoreman
subrogates the stevedore to his rights as against such third persons unless
the longshoreman or his representative brings an action within six months
after paymentf If the stevedore exercises his subrogated rights against
third persons and is successful, all recovery in excess of the amount that
the stevedore has paid to the longshoreman is divided between the two,
with the longshoreman getting four-fifths.'
In addition to his statutory rights against the stevedore-employer, the
injured longshoreman has substantial opportunity for recovery from the
shipowner on whose ship he is performing his stevedoring duties. Not only
may suit be brought for injuries under maritime tort law, but since Seas
Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,8 the shipowner may be held liable for injuries to
the longshoreman under the maritime doctrine of "unseaworthiness," a
type of strict liability formerly applied only to seamen.
When a longshoreman suffers an injury, therefore, both the stevedore
and the shipowner may find themselves liable without being at fault-the
stevedore for compensation under the Longshoremen's Act, and the ship-
owner for damages under the strict liability doctrine of "unseaworthi-
ness." Problems arise after one of them has incurred such liability and
attempts to recoup from the other his payments to the longshoreman. As
was noted, payment of compensation under the Longshoremen's Act sub-
rogates the employing stevedore to the claims of the injured longshore-
man if the latter does not sue within six months of payment,1" thus allow-
ing the stevedore to proceed against the shipowner in those cases where
the latter might be liable to the longshoreman. But the Sieracki decision,
Acceptance of such compensation under an award in a compensation
order filed by the deputy commissioner shall operate as an assignment to
the employer of all rights of the person entitled to compensation to recover
damages against such third person unless such person shall commence an
action against such third person within six months after such award.
33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1964).
' "The employer shall pay any excess to the person entitled to compensation
or to the representative, less one-fifth of such excess which shall belong to the
employer." Id. § 933(e) (2).
S328 U.S. 85 (1946).
'The concept of unseaworthiness as applied to seamen and longshoremen has
little to do with the vessel's ability to encounter the hazards of the sea. Rather, it
is viewed in terms of safety hazards to individuals working on board the ship.
See H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT 13-20 (1963); Com-
ment, Unseaworthiness, Operational Negligence, and the Death of the Longshore-
mens and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 550 (1968).
For an example of how "strict" the liability under "unseaworthiness" is, see
Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960).
1033 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1964).
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while holding th shipowner liable to a longshoreman for injuries caused
by "unseaworthiness," provided no method by which the shipowner could
be compensated by the stevedore when the unseaworthy condition was
caused by the latter. Thus the stevedore was able to recoup his compensa-
tion payments to the longshoreman through the subrogation provisions
of the Longshoremen's Act"' even if the longshoreman's injuries resulted
from an unseaworthy condition that the employing stevedore had created;
and the shipowner had no way of preventing such an action, or of being
compensated by the stevedore who was at fault. "The absolute liability
of the shipowner for unseaworthiness and the fact that its vessel could
easily be rendered unseaworthy without its knowledge by the acts of a
land based contractor created a situation which cried out for relief."12
In addressing itself to this problem, the Supreme Court, after reject-
ing any tort theory of contribution, accepted the contention that when the
stevedore made the contract with the shipowner he impliedly warranted
that his services were to be carried out in a "workmanlike manner." Thus,
in the landmark decision of Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S.
Corp.,3 the Court found that a breach of this warranty would entitle the
shipowner to indemnity for his payments to an injured longshoreman.
The controlling standard of "workmanlike" was conveniently vague so
as to allow fluid application as each situation required, thereby leaving
to the judgment of the court the task of balancing the liabilities in a given
case. 4 It is important to note that negligence on the part of the ship-
owner will not bar his action for indemnity from the stevedore unless
the negligence is of such nature as to prevent the stevedore from carrying
out his implied warranty.'"
As a result of the Ryan decision, the shipowner now possesses an
independent right of action against the stevedore apart from the long-
shoreman's right to compensation from the stevedore, while the stevedore
possesses certain subrogated rights of the longshoreman against the ship-
owner. Damages for breach of the stevedore's warranty are measured by
1Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (f953) ; Halcyon Lines v. Haenn
Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).12 H. BAER, supra note 9, at 183.
350 U.S. 124 (1956). For a thorough discussion of pre-Ryan decisions, see
Weinstock, The Employer's Duty to Indemnify Shipowners for Damages Recovered
by Harbor Workers, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 321 (1954).
" See, e.g., Italia Societa per Azioni di Navigazione v. Oregon Stevedoring Co.,
376 U.S. 315 (1964).
"
5See, e.g., Crumady v. The Joachim Hendrick Fisser, 358 U.S. 423 (1959);
Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Oper. Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
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the amount of damages paid to the longshoreman by the shipowner."8
However, there is no correlation between the compensation paid to the
longshoreman by the stevedore under the Longshoremen's Act and the
amount he seeks to recover under the subrogated claim against the ship-
owner.' 7 Since the longshoreman's recovery from the stevedore is mea-
sured by a wage-scaled compensation allotment,"8 it would seem that,
normally, the amount of recovery against the shipowner under the long-
shoreman's rights, if the shipowner was found liable, would exceed any
compensation liability incurred by the stevedore to, the longshoreman.
It was inevitable, however, that a situation would arise in which the
liability of the stevedore to the longshoreman would be greater than the
amount the stevedore could recover through his subrogated claim under
the Longshoremen's Act. In Burnshide Shipping Co. v. Federal Marine
Terminals, Inc. 9 a longshoreman, Gordon T. McNeill, was killed on board
a ship owned by Burnside. The potential statutory liability of Federal, the
employing stevedore, under the Longshoremen's Act amounted to an
approximated sum of $70,000.20 However, under the Illinois wrongful
death statute, which would govern the stevedore's subrogated claim under
the Longshoreman's Act,2 the maximum recovery for wrongful death
is $30,000.22 The administratrix of McNeill's estate brought a wrongful
death action against the shipowner who, in turn, sought indemnification
from the stevedore under the Ryan doctrine of breach of implied warranty
for workmanlike service. The stevedore company filed a counterclaim for
their potential liability of $70,000. In trying to avoid the statutory
wrongful death limit of $30,000 for its subrogated claim against the ship-
owner, the stevedore argued that there was a separate cause of action in
its favor against the shipowner apart from those subrogated rights under
the Longshoremen's Act of the employee's wrongful death claim. Holding
that the method provided under the Longshoremen's Act was the steve-
dore's exclusive remedy against the shipowner, the trial court dismissed
" See Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 125
(1956).
27 33 U.S.C. § 933(b) (1964).1 Id. § 908-09.
10392 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1968), aff'g 284 F. Supp. 740 (N.D. Ill. 1967), cert.
granted, 393 U.S. 820 (1968).
"2 392 F.2d at 919.
" Absent statutory provisions, there is no maritime wrongful death action.
Since Congress has not provided for recovery for wrongful death that occurs within
the territorial limits of a state, the Supreme Court has supplemented the maritime
law with that state's wrongful death statute. H. BAER, spra note 9, at 99.
2" ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 70, § 2 (1967).
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the counterclaim. 23 The circuit court affirmed the district court's hold-
ing,24 and Federal, the employing stevedore, is seeking review before the
Supreme Court, where decision is presently pending.
The cases that may be correlated to those issues presented in Burnside
have, with few exceptions, agreed with the district court's holding.25
There is no direct authority for finding the shipowner separately liable to
the stevedore,26 but some cases have hinted that there may be occasions
when a separate contractual liability may flow directly from the shipowner
to the stevedore.
2 7
Actions in contract and tort offer the two possible approaches to the
independent liability concept. The tort theory presents the weaker base
for a cause of action separate from the statutory right of subrogation,
although it has had some recent support in admiralty circles. 21 One prob-
lem in the tort area is defining just what standard of duty is owed by the
shipowner to the stevedore, as contrasted with his duty to the longshore-
man. Despite allowing the longshoreman to avail himself of the doctrine
of unseaworthiness against the shipowner, strong case law has expressed
judicial unwillingness to extend the coverage of the doctrine past the
individual longshoreman.2 9 In addition, actions under a negligence theory
should fail because the duty owed by the shipowner to the stevedore, as
contrasted to the duty owed to the longshoreman, is too remote for legal
cognizance.3 ° It is understandable, therefore, that in Burnside the employ-
2 284 F. Supp. at 744-45.
='392 F.2d 918 (7th Cir. 1968).
2 See, e.g., Doleman v. Levine, 295 U.S. 221 (1935) (no cause of action for
part payment of compensation); United States v. Klein, 153 F.2d 55 (8th Cir.
1946) (statutory provisions for employer recovery of compensation paid under
Federal Employees' Compensation Act exclusive for employer as to third persons);
The Federal No. 2, 21 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1927); United States v. The S.S. Wash-
ington, 172 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Va. 1959); California Cas. Indem. Exch. v. United
States, 74 F. Supp. 401 (S.D. Cal. 1947); McCormick v Zander Reum Co., 25
Ill. 2d 241, 184 N.E.2d 882 (1962). Cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332
U.S. 301 (1947).
2" Burnside Shipping Co. v. Federal Marine Terminals, Inc., 392 F.2d 918,
919 (7th Cir. 1968).
'Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 170 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
8 Proudfoot, supra note 2.
29See, e.g., Albina Engine & Mach. Works, Inc. v. Hershey Choc. Corp., 295
F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1961) ; Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Intl, 170 F. Supp. 601
(S.D. Cal. 1959).
" Cf. Crab Orchard Improv. Co. v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 115 F.2d 277, 282 (4th
Cir. 1940).
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ing stevedore limited its argument to the Supreme Court to an implied
contractual theory as grounds for a separate cause of action."'
The implied contractual warranty is not an unfamiliar concept in
admiralty. As was noted earlier by the excerpt from Les Costumes do la
Mar, even the medieval longshoreman was "bound to load and unload
[the ship] . . .well and diligently.. ,,." The Ryan decision found such
a duty owing as an implied warranty of "workmanlike" service ;'3 but the
duty is owned by the stevedore-employer, not by the individual long-
shoreman. If the court can find an implied warranty running in favor of
the shipowner against the stevedore, would it necessarily follow that it
should find such a warranty running in favor of the stevedore against the
shipowner?
The possibility of finding such an implied warranty in favor of the
stevedore has not been entirely discarded. One of the most in depth
considerations of the duties of the shipowner with respect to the steve-
dore was given in Hugev v. Dampskisaktieselskabet International.4 The
decision suggested that there was some minimal standard that the ship-
owner warranted to the stevedore, although in that case no breach was
found.
The surrounding circumstances of fact, and that of law ....
prompt the holding that, absent express provision to the contrary, the
shipowner owes to the stevedoring contractor under the stevedoring
contract the implied-in-fact obligations: (1) to exercise ordinary care
under the circumstances to place the ship .. . in such condition that
an expert and experienced stevedoring contractor . . .will be able
... to load or discharge the cargo . .. in a workmanlike manner and
with reasonable safety to persons and property; and (2) to give the
stevedoring contractor reasonable warning of the existence of any
latent or hidden danger . . .35
It will be remembered that negligence of the shipowner has not been held
a bar to his seeking indemnification from a stevedore for the latter's
breach of his implied warranty of workmanlike service.3" If the ship-
"Brief for Petitioner, Federal Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Burnside Shipping
Co., - U.S. - (1969).
" See note 1, supra, and accompanying text.
"Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
"' 170 F. Supp. 601 (S.D. Cal. 1959), aff'd sub non., Metropolitan Stevedore Co.
v. Dampskisaktieselskabet Int'l, 274 F.2d 875 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 803
(1960).
"170 F. Supp. at 610-11.
"See note 15, supra.
19691
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
owner is going to be allowed to collect indemnification despite his own
negligent conduct, it would not seem logical that such negligence could
conversely support an action by the stevedore.3 7 What the Hugev opinion
seems to imply is a doctrine akin to the tort "assumption of risk" theory.
A stevedore should expect that after a long voyage certain hazardous con-
ditions will exist on board the vessel.
Being a mass of plates, pipes, wires, beams and various mechanisms,
each to some degree vulnerable to the elements, it would be too much
to expect a cargo vessel to arrive in port with all equipment, appli-
ances and facilities in a fully seaworthy condition.38
While the shipowner impliedly covenants to exercise reasonable care to
furnish a safe ship, the stevedore accepts the risks that he obviously
expects to find on board.
Stevedoring contractors hold themselves out as being trained and
equipped to cope with these conditions and these dangers. To this
end, the stevedoring contractor is usually given full use and charge
of the ship's loading and unloading equipment and appliances and the
cargo hatches and holds. So it is that the stevedoring contractor can-
not reasonably expect, and does not expect, to board a vessel which in
all respects . . . is in a seaworthy condition, or even in a reasonably
safe condition.39
The "assumption of risk" concept conveniently compliments the decisions
holding that negligence on the part of the shipowner (short of that
which prevents the stevedore from fulfilling his implied warranty of
workmanlike service) will be no bar to the shipowner's indemnification
from the stevedore for the shipowner's liability to the injured longshore-
man. Such a solution also has the advantage of being "situational"; it
can be manipulated by the courts in much the same manner as the concept
of "workmanlike service" is applied in shipowner indemnity cases.40
A cause of action apart from the stevedore's subrogated rights under
the Longshoremen's Act could be found in such an implied obligation of
the shipowner to furnish a safe ship with the concomitant implied assump-
tion by the stevedore of risks produced by the predictable hazards to be
found on board. In practical application, the courts could weigh the
various factors that enter such a relationship, such as the length of the
"7 Cf. Proudfoot, supra note 2, at 444.
" 170 F. Supp. at 610.
a9 Id.
40 See note 13 supra, and accompanying text.
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voyage, the type of cargo that is carried, the age of the vessel, the season,
and the climate of the port. Liability would be predicated not on what is
foreseeable by the shipowner, but on what is foreseeable in a given situa-
tion by the stevedore."
It might be questioned, however, whether such a finding of an implied
contractual obligation on the part of the shipowner to the stevedore would
disturb the equilibrium imposed on their relationship by the Ryan de-
cision. In the great majority of cases, an equitable result can be reached
by using the existing actions of the longshoreman under the subrogation
provisions of the Longshoremen's Act. Only in the few cases where the
problem as presented in Burnside arises would the theory of the steve-
dore's independent action be useful. It may be that the equitable result
possible in the instant case would not justify problems, such as the follow-
ing, that an implied contractual obligation on the shipowner would pre-
sent.
1. Does the stevedore's action under such an implied warranty bar
the longshoreman from bringing a subsequent action against the ship-
owner? If the independent action by the stevedore is found to be no bar
to the longshoreman's tort action, then the stevedore may recover for
his potential liability from the shipowner who will still be held liable to
the longshoreman, thus producing dangers of double recovery. If the
solution to that problem is to give the stevedore an action only for that
amount in excess of what the longshoreman may recover, it is tantamount
to admission that the action is not independent, but defined solely by the
rights of the longshoreman.
If, instead, such an independent action by the stevedore is held to bar
any future action by the longshoreman, then it must be conceded that the
rights on which the suit is brought are not those of the stevedore, but
actually those of the longshoreman. A method has already been provided
for such recovery under the subrogation provisions of the Longshore-
men's Act. Moreover, such a method of destroying the longshoreman's
cause of action against the shipowner may produce harsh results when
the stevedore fails in his independent action, especially since the long-
shoreman's consent need not be obtained for the stevedore's suit to be
brought initially if the action is truly independent.
2. Would a breach of the stevedore's warranty of workmanlike
service relieve the shipowner of his warranty to provide a reasonably safe
' Cf. Proudfoot, supra note 2, at 443-44.
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ship? Or, conversely, would a breach of the implied obligation on the
part of the shipowner justify a breach by the stevedore of his warranty?
Such questions might be answered by ascertaining who breached his
respective warranty first (a question of fact), or whether the initial breach
is material or not (a question of law) .42
3. If there will be more than one action (and with independent causes
of action, such a result is inevitable) what effect will the doctrines of
res judicata and collateral estoppel have on the second proceeding?
The answers to these problems are not easily found without in some
way disturbing settled rules of law; to find a separate cause of action in
favor of the stevedore could open a new "Pandora's box," causing more
problems than it cured. The Supreme Court, after witnessing the dis-
tressing result of its Sieracki decision, may tred with more caution in
Burnside. The fact that a method of recovery already exists within the
framework of the Longshoremen's Act should carry great weight. Its
provisions would be entirely adequate under normal circumstances.
THOMAs B. ANDERSON, JR.
Civil Procedure-Broadening the Use of Collateral Estoppel-
The Requirement of Mutuality of Parties
While driving Northland's car, Mackris collided with Murray and
was killed. Northland sued Murray for his negligence and recovered for
the damage to the car. Then Mrs. Mackris sued Murray for the wrong-
ful death of her husband, claiming that the judgment in Northland's favor
in the first action was conclusive of the issues of liability in the second.
The federal district court agreed and gave her summary judgment. In
Mackris v. Murray,1 the sixth circuit took a different view and reversed.
Although applying Michigan law, the court expressed a strong commit-
ment against such a broad application of res judicata.2
"I For a brief consideration of this problem, see id. at 444.
1397 F.2d 74 (6th Cir. 1968).
2 The federal court considered itself at liberty to construct a possible state court
decision. The leading case, Clark v. Naufel, 238 Mich. 249, 43 N.W.2d 839 (1950),
refused to allow the use of collateral estoppel defensively due to lack of mutuality of
parties. Other cases, such as De Polo v. Grieg, 338 Mich. 703, 62 N.W.2d 441
(1954), admit that the modem rule is Bernhard v. Bank of America Natl Trust
& Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942), which permits the use of
collateral estoppel by a non-party in the first action, but decides the issue on differ-
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
Mutuality of parties is a legal concept that requires a party, in order to
assert the collateral estoppel effect of a judgment, to be bound himself
by that judgment. In this case, Mrs. Mackris would not have been
estopped from litigating had the first action been in Murray's favor: due
process considerations prevent closing litigation to one never a party.4
Because she was not bound, mutuality would preclude Mrs. Mackris'
asserting Northland's judgment against Murray. In the classic case of
Bernhard v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association,5
the Supreme Court of California broke through the ancient requirement
of mutuality in applying collateral estoppel. There a defendant was per-
mitted to assert a judgment on the identical issues against a party to that
earlier action, although the defendant had not been a party.
Because the language used in Bernhard was broader than the facts
required,6 however, courts and legal writers have disagreed over the
ent grounds. The Mackris court felt that Clark was possibly a stale case. The
decision here is that Bernhard, even if it were adopted expressly in Michigan,
would not go so far as to allow estoppel to cover these facts.
See Spettigue v. Mahoney, 445 P.2d 557 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968), which faced
the same problem found in Mackrig and reached the identical result.
'Mutuality of parties is not to be confused with the requirement of mutuality
of issues. The issues litigated upon and decided in the prior judgment must be
identical with the issues of the present suit, now sought to be concluded by collateral
estoppel. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807,
813, 122 P.2d 892, 895 (1942) ; Crosland-Cullen Co. v. Crosland, 249 N.C. 167, 170,
105 S.E.2d 655, 657 (1958) ; F. JAMES, CIvIL PROCEDURE §§ 11.18-.21 (1965) ; cf.
Finlayson v. Cabarrus Bank & Trust Co., 181 F. Supp. 838, 850 (M.D.N.C.
1960).
' The opportunity to be heard is an essential requisite of due process of law
in judicial proceedings .... And as a State may not, consistently with the
Fourteenth Amendment, enforce a judgment against a party named in the
proceedings without a hearing or an opportunity to be heard . . . , so it
cannot, without disregarding the requirement of due process, give a con-
clusive effect to a prior judgment against one who is neither a party nor
in privity with a party therein.
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. City of Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918). See Queen
City Coach Co. v. Burrell, 241 N.C. 432, 85 S.E.2d 688 (1955).
19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). In the original action Mrs. Bernhard and
others had objected to an accounting filed by Cook, the executor of a decedent's
estate. After a hearing on the merits, the accounting was accepted and it was
held that certain sums of money had been inter vivos gifts to Cook and were
not to be administered. Later Mrs. Bernhard was named successor administratrix,
and she sued the bank, who was not a party to the accounting action, to recover
the identical sums in dispute in the first suit. The bank was allowed to assert as a
defense the original judgment by way of collateral estoppel of the issues of owner-
ship.
s In determining the validity of a plea of res judicata three questions are
pertinent: Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the
one presented in the action in question? Was there a final judgment on the
19691
692 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Voi.47
extent of the repudiation of the mutuality doctrine. In Mackris the sixth
circuit went to some length to explain why collateral estoppel was not
applicable. It distinguished Bernhard in one quite important feature. In
that case the earlier judgment was asserted defensively; in Mackris the
plaintiff was attempting to assert it offensively. This distinction has been
a point of conflict. The problem may be described as this: even if col-
lateral estoppel may be asserted defensively by a non-party, is it fair
to permit a judgment of liability against a defendant to be conclusive of
his liability to all non-parties who have an identical claim against him?
Judge O'Sullivan, for the sixth circuit, made the following argument.
Suppose the first action filed and tried is a fifty-dollar property damage
suit. Defendant's counsel sends his young associate to defend in order
to give him trial experience, and he loses. Then another plaintiff sues the
same defendant for one hundred thousand dollars for personal injuries,
based on the same acts of negligence, and asserts that the fifty-dollar judg-
ment has established liability and that the only issue for trial is damages.
Judge O'Sullivan felt that this unfairness would likely result should he
affirm the summary judgment." A more bizarre hypothetical case involves
a commercial airliner crash. Numerous death actions are separately filed,
and the defendant airline wins ten consecutive trials on the issue of its
liability. In the eleventh, however, the airline loses. Is this judgment to
be conclusive of liability in favor of all claims yet to be tried?'
Several other courts have disagreed with the distinction made in
Mackris. In a similar accident, one driver recovered five thousand dollars
against the other driver for personal injuries. The owner of the car the
first plaintiff drove then sued that same defendant for his property loss,
8,250 dollars, and asserted the first judgment, to which it had not been
a party, as an estoppel of issues. In B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall,9 the
New York Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the second
plaintiff. The rationale offered by DeWitt, similar to that in Bernhard,
merits? Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in
privity with a party to the prior adjudication?
Id. at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
397 F.2d at 81.
8 This hypothetical case originated in Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel:
Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REv. 281 (1957) [hereinafter cited
as Currie], and was used by a California court in Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal.
App. 2d 762, 767-68, 327 P.2d 111, 115-16 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958). The Nevarov
usage was quoted extensively in Mackris v. Murray, 397 F.2d 74, 79-80 (6th Cir.
1968).
19 N.Y.2d 141, 225 N.E.2d 195, 278 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1967) (a 4-3 decision).
See McCourt v. Algiers, 4 Wis. 2d 607, 91 N.W.2d 194 (1958).
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is that when one party has had full opportunity to litigate the issues in-
volved and the judgment is against him, he then has had his day in court
and litigation should be closed. Indeed, this is the basic policy in favor
of all forms of res judicata. Yet it does not seem to outweigh the possible
harsh effects noted in the hypothetical situations above.
The question of the offensive assertion of collateral estoppel raises a
problem of differing policies. The original rule of absolute mutuality was
based on a sense of fair play and abhorence of unequal advantage, but it
has often collapsed before the "day in court" rationale. In the face of
the public interest in concluding matters of litigation pursuant to due
process of the law, how strong are the arguments in favor of the limita-
tion exemplified in Mackris?
A potential multiple defendant, like Murray or the hypothetical air-
lines, must make tactical decisions in the opening suit. The defendant
must plan its defense-specifically the amount of its resources it wishes
to pour into obtaining a favorable judgment-in relation -to damages
claimed, the possibilities of settlement, and the disadvantages of being
defendant (reduced options of venue, of court of jurisdiction, and the
like).1° In a case in which the defendant decides not to litigate as force-
fully as possible, subsequent use of an adverse judgment as estoppel in
another suit could work a severe hardship (e.g., O'Sullivan's hypo-
thetical)."" To the defendant, the important factor regarding any col-
lateral estoppel effect is predictability, the knowledge beforehand whether
an adverse judgment will be conclusive in favor of non-parties.12 In a
New York state court or in a Michigan federal court this should now be
clear. Yet in a fact situation like Mackris, in a jurisdiction that has em-
braced Bernhard without deciding on offensive assertion, the defendant
will be strongly tempted to settle the smaller property damage claim if he
believes the later personal injury or death suit will go to trial. If his
" See Currie 287-88.
" See B. R. DeWitt, Inc. v. Hall, 19 N.Y.2d 141, 149, 225 N.E.2d 195, 199, 278
N.Y.S.2d 596, 602 (1967) (dissenting opinion), for another possible complication.
Because liability insurance is so widespread, actions are often defended by an un-
joined insurer, who makes the tactical decisions of the defense. It is possible that
the defendant is insured by two different companies. A second action may in effect
be against an insurer who was not involved in the first suit (and who was con-
ceivably even without notice of that suit). Assuming the defendant loses the first
action, if that action had been for a relatively small property claim, and the
second was a large personal injury suit, and two insurers were involved, the
injustice is clear.
"
2See Berner v. British Commonwealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d
Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966).
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appellate court should adopt the DeWitt rule, the defendant has a heavy
burden to escape liability for the large claim. First, he must successfully
defend the initial property suit in order to prevent its offensive use in the
subsequent trial. Then he must win the actual litigation with the per-
sonal injury claimant. In effect, the defendant must twice convince trial
courts of his case, whereas the personal injury claimant has no such
burden. A further complicating factor is the possible difference in jury
reactions between large personal injury claims and comparatively small
property claims. A jury that is untroubled about imposing liability in
a five thousand dollar property action might hesitate and consider the
issues more seriously in a suit involving hundreds of thousands of dollars,
had it the opportunity to decide both claims.
Often as litigation in fact works out, the defendant may have such
a tremendous stake in the first suit that considerations of collateral effect
of the judgment are incidental. For instance, in United States v. United
Air Lines, Inc.,3 a federal district court allowed the offensive assertion of
a prior judgment against the defendant airlines in a crash case. The first
suit consolidated twenty-four claims totaling nearly three million dollars.
The second suit involved only seven claims; these two suits were the
bulk of possible litigation from the crash. The court said that, in this
situation, the defendant had had a full and fair opportunity to litigate in
the first action and had no new evidence to offer; a new trial on the
issue of liability would be wasteful. 4 Certainly on these facts it is certain
the defendant fought that first suit to its utmost. What then is the principle
of the case--that a certain amount of money must be involved before a
prior judgment may be offensively asserted? If the defendant needs a rule
of predictability, should the appellate court particularize and decide ex
post facto the estoppel effect of a judgment? The alternatives would seem
to be a general rule against any offensive assertion of collateral estoppel,
or a rule permitting such an assertion of any judgment, even Judge
O'Sullivan's fifty-dollar judgment.Y
11 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash. 1962), aff'd sub nom., United Air Lines, Inc.
v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).1, It would be a travesty upon that concept [the interest of justice] to now
require these plaintiffs who are the survivors of passengers for hire of the
United Air Lines plane to again re-litigate the issue of liability after it has
been so thoroughly and consummately litigated in the trial court in the 24
consolidated cases tried at Los Angeles.
216 F.2d at 728.
" Professor Currie initially suggested an alternative approach to the problem of
ihe offensive assertion of collateral estoppel, based upon who initiated the prior ac-
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In defining the law of collateral estoppel, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina has been somewhat ambiguous toward the many-faceted problem
of mutuality of parties.1" Our court often has reaffirmed its allegiance to
the principle of mutuality,1 7 but several cases and their subsequent treat-
ment require close examination, using Mackris as an analytic tool, to
ascertain the law in this jurisdiction.
In the face of the requirement of mutuality of parties, a 1958 case,
Crosland-Cullen Co. v. Crosland,1 8 created an exception. A corporation
was attempting to prove that a life insurance policy made it the bene-
ficiary, but the corporation lost in a suit against the insurer." It then
sued the true beneficiary on the same issues. The second defendant was
allowed to assert the first judgment against the plaintiff by way of
estoppel, because the latter had had a full hearing in the first action and
should not be permitted to relitigate, even though the second defendant
was not a party to the original action.2" Crosland is virtually the same
case as Bernhard: a party sues D-1 and loses, then on the same issues sues
tion. His concept was that the previous judgment may be asserted by the one not a
party to that action, either offensively or defensively, if the party asserted against
was the initiator of that prior litigation. This would protect the defendant subject
to multiple claims, but would allow offensive assertions in certain instances. Currie
291-321. Currie subsequently recanted, and endorsed the United Air Lines ap-
proach. Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. REV. 25 (1965).
1" North Carolina has long recognized the privity exception to the requirement
of mutuality. If in the first suit A sues X and loses, and in the second suit A sues
previously non-party Y on the same issues, Y may assert X's judgment as col-
lateral estoppel if and only if Y is within a certain degree of judicially defined
privity with X. This exception is quite intricate and beyond the scope of this note.
See Sumner v. Marion, 272 N.C. 92, 157 S.E.2d 667 (1967) ; Masters v. Dunstan,
256 N.C. 520, 124 S.E.2d 574 (1962) ; Leary v. Virginia-Carolina joint Stock Land
Bank, 215 N.C. 501, 2 S.E.2d 570 (1939); F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDUR §§ 11.31-.33(1965). Furthermore, in a limited number of situations, courts may consider parties
in privity with litigants in the prior action as bound by that judgment to which
they themselves were not parties. Id. at §§ 11.26-.30. This accounts for the refer-
ences to privity in notes 4 & 6 supra.
" Kleibor v. Rogers, 265 N.C. 304, 307, 144 S.E.2d 27, 30 (1965); Shaw v.
Eaves, 262 N.C. 656, 662, 138 S.E.2d 520, 526 (1964); Masters v. Dunstan, 256
N.C. 520, 524, 124 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1962).18249 N.C. 167, 105 S.E.2d 655 (1958).
18 Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Crosland-Cullen Co., 234 F.2d 780 (4th Cir.
1956), revlg 133 F. Supp. 473 (W.D.N.C. 1955).
-o It is elementary and fundamental that every person is entitled to his day in
court to assert his own rights or to defend against their infringement....
But public policy is equally adamant in its demand for an end to litigation
when complainant has exercised his right and a court of competent jurisdic-
tion has ascertained that the asserted invasion has not occurred.
249 N.C. at 170, 105 S.E.2d at 657 (citations omitted).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
D-2 (not a party in the first action), and is barred by a defensive use of
collateral estoppel. 21
Crosland's status is unclear. It has often been ignored when possibly
applicable; in only one case has it been used as a basis for the assertion of
collateral estoppel by a non-party." On the other hand, many jurisdic-
tions that have recently considered cases in this fairly narrow span of
facts have reached the same result as Bernhard and Crosland.3 It would
not be presumptuous to describe Bernhard as the modern, more equitable
approach. 4
The civil use of criminal convictions presents related problems. It has
been generally held that a conviction will not be an estoppel against the
convicted party in subsequent civil litigation.25 Application of this rule
would ordinarily arise when the convicted is the defendant and conviction
is sought to be asserted offensively.2" In a different situation, Taylor was
convicted of the crime of willful abandonment and non-support of his wife
and children; later he sued her for divorce on the basis of two years'
separation. She was allowed to assert his criminal conviction (to which
she was obviously not a party) as a bar by estoppel .2  The court based its
holding on the Crosland case and endorsed its rationale; however, this
use of collateral estoppel of a criminal conviction is limited to the situa-
21 Crosland did not specifically limit its holding to defensive assertions of col-
lateral estoppel, except perhaps by implication. Nor did Bernhard. See note
6 supra.
Other authorities concur on the specific point that Crosland embraces the rule
of Bernhard. See Sanderson v. Balfour, - N.i. -, -, 247 A.2d 185, 187 (1968) ;
Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CAL. L. REv. 25, 43 (1965) (ap-
pendix); Survey of North Carolina Case Law: Trial and Appellate Practice, 37
N.C.L. REv. 463, 470-71 (1959).See notes 27-29 infra and accompanying text.23See, e.g., Tezak v. Cooper, 24 Ill. App. 2d 356, 164 N.E.2d 493 (1960) ; Lustik
v. Rankila, 269 Minn. 515, 131 N.W.2d 741 (1964); Sanderson v. Balfour, -
N.H. -, 247 A.2d 185 (1968).
The pre-Bernhard rule, requiring mutuality of parties except in the privity situ-
ations, is exemplified by RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942). Of the juris-
dictions that have holdings, this still seems to be the majority rule. See Spettigue
v. Mahoney, 445 P.2d 557, 560 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968); 30A Al!. JUR. Judgments§§ 392-93 (1958); 1B J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRcTICE 0.412[1] (1965).
2" Perhaps a cynic might note that the equities are less apparent to appellate
courts in personal injury, auto accident cases (see cases at notes 32, 34, & 36) than
in non-tort cases (e.g., cases at notes 5, 18, & 27). Cf. Morgan v. Brooks, 241
N.C. 527, 532, 85 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1955).
22 30A Am. JUR. Judgments § 473 (1958).
26 Cf., Durham Bank & Trust Co. v. Pollard, 256 N.C. 77, 123 S.E.2d 104 (1961).
The criminal conviction of the defendant may not even be admitted as evidence of a
fact.
", Taylor v. Taylor, 257 N.C. 130, 125 S.E.2d 373 (1962).
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tion in which the convicted is attempting to benefit from the fruit of his
crime.28 As the later case of Moore v. Young 9 illustrated, this restriction
is broader than the Mackris restriction to defensive use by a non-party.
As the result of an automobile accident, Young was convicted of the in-
voluntary manslaughter of Mrs. Moore. Subsequently Moore sued Young,
a claim that was settled, but Young's counterclaim against Moore for his
negligence went to trial. Moore attempted to assert Young's conviction
against him as conclusive of liability issues, but the supreme court would
not permit this. It said that Young's claim was based not upon his own
negligence, the "fruits of the crime" for which he was convicted, but
rather upon Moore's negligence, a separate element of liability. This
judicially defined distinction appears highly artificial. Although Moore's
negligence may have contributed to the accident, Young's conviction for
manslaughter should certainly be sufficient to establish contributory negli-
gence and thus be an adequate basis for applying the collateral estoppel
doctrine.
North Carolina courts have faced other attempts by a non-party to
the previous action to assert a prior judgment against an adverse party
in the subsequent litigation. Although the use of collateral estoppel is
seldom allowed and Crosland is rarely discussed,30 most cases may be
reconciled with the Bernhard-Crosland rule. The frequent attitude of
the court is to state that mutuality of parties is required and disregard
Crosland. A trio of recent cases is illustrative.
An automobile accident caused Gallimore to defend two suits against
him. In the first, car owner Stewart recovered a judgment on a verdict
that Gallimore was negligent.3 1 In the second, 2 Kayler, driver of Stewart's
car and not a party in the former suit, attempted to assert Stewart's judg-
ment as conclusive of all issues of Gallimore's liability to him. This was
the same basic problem as was found in Mackris. Although arriving at
the same result, our court handled the case differently. It simply said
28 See Eagle, Star, & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82, 140
S.E. 314 (1927), noted in Note, 6 N.C.L. REv. 333 (1928). In a suit by the in-
sured to collect for fire loss, insurer may assert as a defense the plaintiff's convic-
tion for intentional burning to defraud the insurer. This is the leading case, and
a basis for the decision in Taylor.20260 N.C. 654, 133 S.E.2d 510 (1963).
00 See Shaw v. Eaves, 262 N.C. 656, 661, 138 S.E.2d 520, 525 (1964), which
cited Crosland, but used it only to confuse matters.
Stewart v. Gallimore, 265 N.C. 696, 144 S.E.2d 862 (1965).
02 Kayler v. Gallimore, 269 N.C. 405, 152 S.E.2d 519 (1967), discussed in
Recent Developments in North Carolina Statutory and Case Law: Civil Procedure,
47 N.C.L. REv. 262, 272-73 (1968).
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that mutuality is required, so that one party cannot assert the estoppel
by judgment unless he was himself a party to that prior action. No
reference was made to the fact this was an attempted offensive assertion
of the judgment, nor to the rule of Crosland.s
A minor sued Rogers for compensation for the injuries he received in
an automobile accident. When a judgment was given for the defendant,
Kleibor, father of the previous plaintiff, sued Rogers to recover the child's
medical costs. The supreme court refused to allow Rogers to assert the
previous judgment against Kleibor.3 4 Kleibor was not a party to the first
suit, and should not be bound because that would deprive him of due
process. This case then could have been decided on the basis of the con-
stitutional requirement. Although the court noted this, it concentrated on
the more technical aspects of mutuality of parties."
A third case seems contrary to the Bernhard-Crosland approach. In
successive suits Mr. and Mrs. Sumner each sued Marion for damages
arising out of an automobile accident; in each suit Marion counterclaimed
for damages. Marion's first counterclaim was nonsuited on the merits, but
Mrs. Sumner was not allowed to assert that prior judgment in the later
litigation." Unfortunately, the only point argued on appeal was whether
Mrs. Sumner was entitled to the traditional privity exception to the
mutuality requirement. In a terse per curiam opinion the court held
she was not. The issue of a general defensive assertion of collateral
estoppel against a party to the original action by one not a party thereto
was not raised.' s
These decisions and others like them may leave the Crosland holding
in jeopardy. On the other hand, the issue may depend on the judiciary's
use of language. Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court,
author of the Bernhard opinion, later described that holding as the
abandonment of the rule of mutuality of estoppel.29 California, nonethe-
less, still does not seem to allow the offensive assertion of collateral
3 See also Wiles v. Mullinax, 270 N.C. 661, 155 S.E.2d 246 (1967); Shaw v.
Eaves, 262 N.C. 656, 138 S.E.2d 520 (1964).3
'Kleibor v. Rogers, 265 N.C. 304, 144 S.E.2d 27 (1965).
"For similar cases, see Wiles v. Mullinax, 270 N.C. 661, 155 S.E.2d 246
(1967) ; Meacham v. Larus & Bros. Co., 212 N.C. 646, 194 S.E. 99 (1937).
" Sumner v. Marion, 272 N.C. 92, 157 S.E.2d 667 (1967), discussed in Recent
Developments, supra note 32, at 272-73.
" Brief for Appellee, Sumner v. Marion, 272 N.C. 92, 157 S.E.2d 667 (1967).
"See also Masters. v. Dunstan, 256 N.C. 520, 124 S.E.2d 574 (1962).
" Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 601, 605, 375 P.2d
439, 440, 25 Cal. Rptr. 559, 560 (1962). This case involved a defensive assertion.
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estoppel.40 If Bernhard and Crosland throw out the mutuality require-
ment, then the frequent reaffirmations of mutuality by the North Carolina
Supreme Court must certainly place Crosland in grave doubt. Yet in
Crosland the court restated its adherence to mutuality and characterized
that case as an "exception. '41 Whenever an appellate court bases its
opinion on a relatively broad rule of law, it is not expected to list all the
exceptions to that rule that it happens to recognize, even those arguably
relevant. Crosland then stands by itself, a wise exception to an ancient
rule, but one lamentably often overlooked by the practicing bar and per-
haps by the court that wrote it.
The sixth circuit in Mackris had to deal with a situation requiring
a mature decision based on relevant policy factors. If mutuality of parties
were not in every case a prerequisite to the application of collateral
estoppel, should it be required in the instance of an offensive assertion?
On the one hand is the policy of concluding litigation once a party has
had a full and fair opportunity to be heard; on the other, is the concern
over placing too heavy a burden upon one party. Bernhard demanded one
result, but Mackris another. The comparable step taken in Crosland can-
not be overlooked for its significance and should not be ignored as con-
trolling precedent. Rather than applying a simple, broad rule of law in
this area, the most equitable result-and collateral estoppel is a product of
equity 42 --may be reached by a closer analysis of the distinction between
the offensive and the defensive assertion of the former judgment.
IRICHARD F. MITCHELL
'
0 McDougall v. Palo Alto Unified School Dist., 212 Cal. App. 2d1 422, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 37 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal. App. 2d 762, 327
P.2d 111 (Dist. Ct. App. 1958). But cf. O'Connor v. O'Leary, 247 Cal. App. 2d
646, -, 56 Cal. Rptr. 1, 4 (Dist. Ct. App. 1967) (dictum); Newman v. Larsen,
225 Cal. App. 2d 22, 36 Cal. Rptr. 883 (Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (offensive assertion
of a criminal conviction permitted).
1249 N.C. at 170, 105 S.E.2d at 657. See Carolina Power & Light Co. v.
Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 238 N.C. 679, 691, 79 S.E.2d 167, 175 (1953) (the
rules requiring mutuality are "subject to exception").
" Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Merrimack Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 238 N.C. 679,
692, 79 S.E.2d 167, 175 (1953).
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Constitutional Law-Resolutions Authorizing State Legislative
Investigations
The power of a legislature to inform itself through investigation is
a valuable tool in the legislative process. A legislative investigation has
been described as neither bird, beast nor fish.
Its proceedings are not judicial, for no issues are brought before it
for decision. It is not a grand jury, for its object is not to indict. It
is not legislative for its recommendations do not have the force of law
until they have passed through regular legislative channels. Yet it
has some of the characteristics of all three .... I
Perhaps this curious mixture of characteristics has made the legislative
investigation susceptible to misuse. Despite periodic challenges, the courts
have consistently upheld the basic authority of legislatures to conduct
investigations.2 When not properly conducted and controlled they can be
a source of great danger to the personal liberties of all who come in their
path.
Particularly threatened are the rights of speech and association
guaranteed by the first and fourteenth amendments.3 The danger may be
direct by threat of compulsory exposure of one's associations and beliefs,4
or it may be indirect-the fear that one might face compulsory disclosure
in the future discourages and inhibits the exercise of first amendment
rights.' This indirect threat is the so-called "chilling" effect on the free
exercise of the constitutionally protected rights of free speech, expression,
and association.'
The courts have been generally reluctant to interfere with the conduct
of legislative investigations, 7 often relying on the doctrine of separation
1 State v. Superior Ct., 40 Wash. 2d 502, 508, 244 P.2d 668, 671 (1952).
'Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273
U.S. 135 (1927); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821); E.x parte
Battelle, 207 Cal. 227, 277 P. 725 (1929).3 U.S. CONST. amends. I & XIV.
'Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 (1959).
Gibson v. Florida Leg. Invest. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
a Id. at 556-57.
7 Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961); Wilkinson v. United States,
365 U.S. 399 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Jordan
v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1963); Mins v. McCarthy, 209 F.2d 307
(D.C. Cir. 1953); Hearst v. Black, 87 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Goldman v.
Olson, 286 F. Supp. 35 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Fischler v. McCarthy, 117 F. Supp. 643(S.D.N.Y. 1954); ASP, Inc. v. Capital Bank & Trust Co., 174 So. 2d 809 (La. Ct.
App.), cert. denied, 247 La. 724, 174 So. 2d 133 (1965).
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of powers as justification for abstention,' but they have recognized an
obligation to protect the actual or threatened infringement of the rights
of individuals.' As the concept of what is encompassed in the first
amendment has broadened, the United States Supreme Court has articu-
lated certain requirements which legislative investigations must meet in
order to be constitutional.
First, there must be a lawful legislative purpose."0 Usually the courts
presume that any legislative investigation is for a valid legislative pur-
pose and place the burden of showing otherwise on anyone who opposes
the investigation." Second, the exposure of private affairs is not per-
mitted unless justified by a valid legislative purpose.'" Third, there must
be a nexus between the information sought and the valid legislative pur-
pose ;13 the questions asked and the information sought must be pertinent
to the subject under inquiry.' 4 In short, to meet constitutional require-
ments the investigation must not be vague in purpose or overly broad in
scope.
The Court has suggested three means by which vagueness and over-
breadth may be avoided: (1) a resolution authorizing the investigation
clearly defining the scope of the inquiry and the powers of the committee;
(2) remarks made by the chairman or by committee members; and (3)
the nature of the proceedings themselves. 5
Early challenges to the fundamental authority of legislative bodies to
investigate asserted that there was a difference between congressional in-
vestigations and those conducted by state legislatures.' 6 There are
'Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880); ASP, Inc. v. Capital Bank &
Trust Co., 174 So. 2d 809, 816 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 247 La. 724, 174 So. 2d
133 (1965).
' DeGregory v. Attorney Gen. of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825 (1966) ; Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957); and cases cited note 7 supra.10 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
11 Scull v. Virginia, 359 U.S. 344 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S.
178 (1957); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); but see Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945), for an indication that under some circum-
stances the presumption will not be entertained when first amendment rights are
threatened because of the preferred position these rights hold in the constitutional
framework. See also Liveright v. Joint Comm., 279 F. Supp. 205 (M.D. Tenn.
1968), holding that no such presumption will be entertained when state legislative
investigations are involved.
"2 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 198 (1957), noted in 36 N.C.L. REv.
320 (1958).
"Gibson v. Florida Leg. Invest. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 543-46 (1963).
"Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 206 (1957).
"Id. at 209.
1 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). The appellee argued that prin-
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numerous state court decisions in which it was assumed that there were
no distinctions based on the United States Constitution, 7 and the Supreme
Court has upheld this view."8 It is suggested, however, that there are
significant non-constitutional differences in legislative investigations on
the two levels.
First, the principles of federalism and the preemption doctrine make
some fields of inquiry exclusively the province of Congress 0 and others
exclusively that of the state legislatures.20 Although these investigative
powers may overlap, a legitimate legislative purpose for a state legislature
may not be a legitimate one for Congress. For example, it is admitted
that congressional committees have no direct authority over schools and
colleges while such institutions are clearly proper subjects for state in-
vestigations.
21
ciples supporting the authority of state legislatures to investigate were inapplicable
to the federal government. He contended that state legislatures possessed all legis-
lative power not expressly or impliedly denied them by the state constitutions, while
in contrast, Congress had only those legislative powers expressly granted to it.
Therefore, as the power of investigation was not expressly granted, it must not
have been conferred upon Congress. Id. at 147. On the other hand, appellant
recognized a similar distinction existed within the states, i.e., that some states had
constitutions that granted all legislative power and only those powers specifically
reserved were forbidden, while others had constitutions that reserved to the people
all powers not expressly granted, but argued that such a distinction was not
applicable to the powers of Congress under the United States Constitution. Id. at
141-42. Though the Court did not specifically discuss these contentions, it is apparent
from its decision upholding the power of Congress to investigate and to compel
the appearance of witnesses that it did not consider them to be significant. In those
several states that view their constitutions as expressly granting legislative power,
this distinction has been urged as grounds for rejecting the power of legislative
investigation. There is no evidence that it has been accepted by any state court.
"' E.g., Ex parte Battelle, 207 Cal. 227, 277 P. 725 (1929) ; State v. Superior Ct.,
40 Wash. 2d 502, 244 P.2d 668 (1952). See Schwartz, Legislative Powers of
Investigation, 57 DicK. L. REV. 31, 43 (1952).
"8 Gibson v. Florida Leg. Invest. Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539, 544-45 (1963). See
generally Bendich, First Amendment Standards for Congressional Investigations,
51 CALIF. L. REV. 311 (1963); McKay, Congressional Investigations and the
Supreme Court, 51 CALIF. L. REv. 267 (1963); Moreland, Congressional Investi-
gations and Private Persons, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 189 (1967).
" E.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956), holding that federal anti-
subversive legislation preempts the states from legislating in this area. But see
Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S. 72 (1959), which held that preemption does not extend
to state action against activities subversive to the state.
'0 "As Congress is without power to legislate upon subjects exclusively within
the power of the states, it cannot investigate those subjects, except as they may
affect matters within the scope of the powers granted to the federal government ......
Annot., 97 L. Ed. 782, 786 (1953).
2 R. CUSHMAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 83 (1956). However,
the authority of Congress may manifest itself in other ways. Cf. Slochower v.
Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956).
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Second, there are obvious structural and procedural differences between
the state and federal levels. Most congressional investigations are initiated
and conducted within the framework of the existing permanent com-
mittee structure in the Congress. The duties and powers of these com-
mittees are defined by the organizational and procedural rules of Con-
gress. Even though an investigation may be initiated by formal resolu-
tion of one or both houses, the general procedure seems to be for an
investigation to be initiated by the particular committee or subcommittee
responsible for the area to be investigated. Thus, the role of a resolution
authorizing an investigation22 is minimal in contrast to the actual conduct
of the investigation. Once the authority of congressional committees to
investigate had been clearly established, the controversy shifted to the
conduct of the investigation itself, and challenges were based on the
narrower grounds of personal immunity and defects in committee pro-
cedure."
In contrast, the typical procedure in the initiation of a state investiga-
tion is for one or both houses of the legislature to pass an authorizing
resolution or statute creating a committee to inquire into a particular
subject.2 4 Generally, this resolution sets forth the purpose of the investi-
gation, designates committee membership--or alternatively who is to
appoint the members-provides for subpoena power, for reports to the
creating legislative body, and for the compensation, if any, of committee
members. The scope of the powers of the investigating committee and the
subjects that it may investigate are primarily determined by the creating
act or resolution.2 5 Thus, the resolution is a logical point of attack by
those wishing to challenge the validity of a state legislative investigation.
Historically these attacks have been based on procedural or state constitu-
tional grounds and have often relied upon distinctions peculiar to the
2 Such a resolution is to be contrasted with a resolution authorizing or creating
a particular committee, which resolution may itself limit what the committee can
investigate. Bowers v. United States, 202 F.2d 447 (D.C. Cir. 1953).
" Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 195 (1957) ; Comment, Congressional
Investigations, 45 ILL. L. P v. 633, 642 (1950).
", Some states, from time to time, have provided for standing investigating com-
mittees or commissions, perhaps the most notable being New Hampshire, which con-
ferred upon the state attorney general the power to investigate subversive activities
in the state. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). Other legis-
latures have vested similar powers in a legislative council to conduct investigations
into various subjects. E.g., State v. Aronson, 132 Mont. 120, 314 P.2d 849 (1957);
State v. Yelle, 29 Wash. 2d 68, 185 P.2d 723 (1947).
2249 Am. JuR. States, Territories and Dependencies § 42 (1943).
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particular state.2" Recently attacks have centered on the constitutional
vices of vagueness and overbreadth. Two recent cases27 brought in federal
district courts, seeking to have state legislative investigations enjoined,
demonstrate the importance of resolutions authorizing state investiga-
tions.
A federal district court awarded injunctive relief in Liveright v.
Joint Committee of the General Assembly of the State of Tennessee.28
A resolution passed by the General Assembly of Tennessee reported that:
the Highlander [Educational and] Research Center of Knox County,
and persons and organizations affiliated therewith, may be involved in
activities subversive to the government of our State, and it is in the
interest of the State and the people that a committee of this General
Assembly be constituted for the purpose of investigating such re-
ports ....
The Center, a non-profit corporation actively engaged in civil rights
activities, sought through its principal directors and officers to have the
investigation enjoined. The plaintiffs alleged that the vagueness and over-
breadth of the resolution rendered it unconstitutional both on its face
and in its application.3"
"6 Some state constitutions require a bill to be duly passed by both houses before
it can have the force of law. In these states anything less than a statute will be
insufficient to authorize an investigation. E.g., Dickenson v. Johnson, 117 Ark.
582, 176 S.W. 116 (1915). Other states consider a concurrent resolution to be
the equivalent of a bill and therefore it can be the source of a lawful investigation.
Many of the early decisions conceded the right of one house of the legislature to
investigate while the legislature was in session, but challenged the right of a
committee authorized by one house (or, in some instances, both) to continue to
operate after adjournment sine die. E.g., State v. Fluent, 30 Wash. 194, 191 P.2d
241 (1948); Ex parle Caldwell, 61 W. Va. 49, 55 S.E. 910 (1906). Other mis-
cellaneous challenges include: State v. Anderson, 180 Kan. 120, 299 P.2d 1078
(1956) (special session authorized to consider only budget matters cannot pass
provision authorizing legislative investigation); Annenberg v. Roberts, 333 Pa.
203, 2 A.2d 612 (1938) (title of authorizing act alleged not sufficient as it pro-
vided for "study" and not for "investigation"); Gilbreath v. Willett, 148 Tenn.
92, 251 S.W. 910 (1923) (governor did not sign act creating investigating com-
mittee when his signature was required); Ex pare Wolters, 64 Tex. Crim. 238,
144 S.W. 531 (1911) (special session authorized to consider only budget matters
cannot pass provision authorizing legislative investigation).
-"Goldman v. Olson, 286 F. Supp. 35 (W.D. Wis. 1968); Liveright v. Joint
Comm., 279 F. Supp. 205 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), noted in 1968 Wis. L. REv. 587.
"8279 F. Supp. 205 (M.D. Tenn. 1968).
29 Id. at 219.
*'Id. at 208. The plaintiffs also alleged the unconstitutionality of certain
Tennessee statutes that conferred powers and authority upon legislative committees.
The court rejected these allegations as insubstantial and frivolous. Id. at 211.
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The events preceding passage of the resolution are germane to under-
standing the plaintiff's challenge. The Center is the successor to another
organization, the Highlander Folk School, which was chartered in 1934
and was concerned with promoting the cause of organized labor. After
World War II its emphasis shifted to racial problems. These civil
rights activities brought the Folk School under the disapproving eye of
the community, and in 1959 it was investigated by the General Assembly.
Later it was raided by the police and arrests were made, but no convictions
obtained. The Tennessee Supreme Court sustained the subsequent revoca-
tion of the School's charter on the grounds that the School sold liquor
without a license and was operated for the profit of the president.3 The
Highlander Center was chartered in 1961 with virtually the same officers
and staff as the defunct Folk School.
Plaintiffs introduced evidence of the Center's unpopularity in the
community and of an earlier, unsuccessful resolution that directed law
enforcement agencies "to use all legal means to cut this cancerous growth
from our state."8 2 The same resolution alleged that the Center was a
haven for "Communists, extreme leftists, fellow travelers and those
who advocate the violent overthrow of our government. ... "3
In granting the injunction, the court acknowledged the general
authority of the legislature to investigate, but it also noted the possible
abuse of the investigative power in infringing upon first amendment
freedoms. Plaintiffs had alleged that they were engaged in first amend-
ment activities, that such activities had made them unpopular in the
community, and that exposure of their beliefs and associations would
result in a chilling effect on the exercise of these freedoms.34
The resolution, as the controlling charter of the committee's powers,
was found to be vague and too broad on its face. The term "subversive"
was so indefinite that it conferred a virtual license upon the committee
to roam about in protected areas, and the resolution was not sufficiently
specific to inform plaintiffs of the nature of the information sought by
the legislature. The court thus found the plaintiffs doubly threatened
with irreparable harm. First, the threat of later disclosure might dis-
" The state had also alleged that the School was being operated in violation
of certain compulsory segregation statutes and that the School harbored lewd and
immoral conduct. The state supreme court held the segregation statutes unconsti-
tutional, but sustained the revocation on the grounds indicated. Id. at 208-09.32 I. at 209.
8 !d.
3
'Id. at 217.
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-courage them from speaking and associating freely. And second, should
the investigation be allowed to proceed without a clearly defined legisla-
lative purpose and the plaintiffs subsequently be called as witnesses, they
would be faced with the unacceptable alternative of either complying fully
and risking exposure, or of refusing and being cited for contempt.
Once plaintiffs had been forced to choose either of the alternatives,
judicial review would be ineffective to alleviate the harm. The evidence
produced by the state tended to indicate that it was "ridding itself of an
unpopular rather than a subversive interest."3
A federal district court in Wisconsin dealt with a similar situation in
'Goldman v. Olson." The plaintiff Goldman was a student at the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin and president of the Madison chapter of Students for a
Democratic Society (SDS). On October 18, 1967, as part of a demonstra-
tion protesting on-campus recruiting by the Dow Chemical Company,
access to certain university buildings was blocked. The violence, hysteria
and police action that followed was widely publicized. Two days later the
Wisconsin State Senate passed a resolution declaring that members of
the SDS and the W.E.B. DuBois Club appeared to be the leaders of
the demonstration, and called for an investigation of "the riotious situa-
tion occurring on the campus during the week of October 16th . . .
[including] ... the possible involvement. . ." of the two organizationsYT
Subsequently, the plaintiffs sought a declaration that the resolution
was unconstitutional on its face as a violation of the first and fourteenth
amendments, again by reason of vagueness and overbreadth, and that the
resolution was unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs by forcing them to
disclose constitutionally protected beliefs and associations. They alleged
that there was no legitimate legislative purpose in the investigation and
sought appropriate injunctive relief. 8 Defendants were members of the
committee that, prior to the institution of this action, had held a hearing
in which Goldman was called. He had testified as to his personal activities
in connection with the demonstration, but had refused to tell the com-
mittee about the activities of others.
The court recognized the general authority of legislative investiga-
tions and the appropriateness of the subject under investigation-the
maintenance of order on the campus-and then cited two constitutional
" Note, 1968 Wis. L. R1v. 587, 589.
" 286 F. Supp. 35 (W.D. Wis. 1968).871d. at 38.88Id. at 37-38.
[VoL 47
1969] STATE LEGISLATIVE INVESTIGATIONS 707
limitations upon state legislative investigations: (1) the concept of due
process in the fourteenth amendment that requires the subject matter
of a particular inquiry to be defined with sufficient explicitness and clarity
to provide a reasonable basis for a witness to decide if a particular ques-
tion put to him is pertinent; and (2) the first amendment concept that
prohibits any invasion of freedom of speech, opinion or association unless
justified by a showing of a substantial nexus between the information
sought and some overriding, compelling state interest.8 9
Although finding the resolution "peripherally vague," the court chose
to examine the resolution, not as it was written, but as it was applied, or
threatened to be applied. 0 It was clear the primary purpose of the in-
vestigation had been understood by Goldman in the hearing already con-
ducted, and the inquiry had not ranged beyond permissible limits. In
spite of the failure of the committee to ensure that any future questions
would be similarly limited, the court did not allow the due process
challenge.
In examining the first amendment limitation the court found that no
connection between the primary subject (the demonstration) and the
secondary subject (the identity of members of the SDS and the DuBois
Club) had been shown. However, the court recognized that the legislature
must have some leeway and that often investigations must "proceed step
by step" ' in order to show the nexus. As yet, permissible bounds had
not been exceeded.
The three-judge court4 2 refused declaratory and injunctive relief,'
but appeared to warn the committee as to its future conduct by stating
that to date no nexus between the primary and secondary subjects had
been shown and no compelling state interest had been demonstrated to
justify the invasion of first amendent freedoms.44
11 Id. at 43.10 Id. at 49.
" Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 130 (1959).
" The two resolutions offer an instructive contrast as to what constitutes a
"state statute" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2281 (1964), and the two cases
contain excellent discussions of when a three-judge federal court will be required.
See generally Currie, The Three-Judge Court in Constitutional Litigation, 32
U. Ci. L. REv. 1 (1964); Note, Federal Jurisdiction--Three-Judge Court-Mean-
ing of "State Statute," 30 N.C.L. Ruv. 423 (1952); Note, 1968 Wis. L. REy. 587.
"'286 F. Supp. at 47-49. One reason given was the traditional reluctance of
courts to interfere with legislative investigations. However, the court noted a
recent abatement in this reluctance (citing Jordan v. Hutcheson, 323 F.2d 597
(4th Cir. 1963) and Liveright) but did not choose to join the trend.
" 286 F. Supp. at 47.
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If properly drafted, an authorizing resolution or statute should contain
a clear and concise statement of the purpose of the investigation, the
scope of the inquiry and the extent of the powers conferred upon the
committee.45 The resolution reflects the will of the legislature as a whole
and not merely the chairman's personal interpretation of that will. As a
written document, it is available to potential witnesses before hearings
commence. The other means suggested for avoiding vagueness and over-
breadth-the remarks of the chairman or committee members and the
nature of the proceedings-may come too late to aid a prospective witness.
As one commentator has pointed out, certain procedural objections-
lack of a quorum, the clarity of a particular question, the particular sub-
ject matter under inquiry, sufficient foundation to show nexus between
primary and secondary subject-can often be met by effective committee
administration and operation.46 However, once a broad, vague resolution
is passed, its constitutional defects are not easily remedied.
The decision in Liveright may be taken to indicate that there is no
remedy short of declaring the resolution unconstitutional. To the district
court in Tennessee the constitutional vice was the existence of a resolu-
tion authorizing an unbridled investigation and the consequent inhibitions
imposed on the exercise of first amendment rights. In Goldman the court
chose to interpret the resolution as applied and not as written. By over-
looking its "peripheral vagueness" and by finding no unconstitutional
application to date, the court in effect ignored any indirect threat of
"chilling." Further, it found that the actual proceedings, as yet, posed
no direct threat.
It could be argued that, in spite of contrary holdings, the two decisions
will have the same practical effect. In Liveright the court protected first
amendment rights by enjoining the investigation. In Goldman the court
precluded any actual infringement of such rights by limiting future in-
quiry until a nexus between the demonstration and the two organizations
' In order to abridge first amendment freedoms the state must show a valid
and legitimate interest that outweighs or overbalances those of the individual.
The courts may turn to the authorizing resolution to determine the existence and
extent of any state interest in an investigation. If the resolution is unclear, even
though not to the point of being unconstitutionally vague, it may fail to show
the legitimate state interest. In the balancing process the investigation will
thus fall to superior first amendment rights. See Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234 (1957), where an authorization for a standing investigation was found
not to show a legitimate state interest.
,' McKay, Congressional Investigations and the Supreme Court, 51 CALIF. L.
REv. 267, 290 (1963).
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had been shown, and by indicating an injunction would issue if first
amendment rights were invaded without a showing of sufficient state
interest. To explain away the differences in the cases in this manner,
however, would be a mistake, for such a disposition fails to recognize that
the decisions represent two distinct judicial viewpoints on legislative in-
vestigations.
The view taken by the Goldman court is the older and currently
prevailing one. Traditionally courts have abstained from interfering
with legislative investigations.4" They have emphasized that the legislature
must be allowed leeway in exercising its powers, that investigations must
be allowed to proceed step by step, and that a legitimate legislative purpose
will be presumed. The general effect of this philosophy has been to deny
injunctive relief.
On the other hand, the granting of the injunction in Liveright per-
haps indicates a more modern approach.4" This view is based on the
concept of enlarged first amendment rights, which the courts have a duty
to protect. It emphasizes that legitimate legislative purpose will not be
presumed when first amendment rights are threatened. A threat may only
be indirect, but the courts may still respond by enjoining the investigation
itself.
One additional explanation is offered to explain the different results
in the two cases. The object of investigation in Liveright was a private
organization operating under a lawful charter. The subject in Goldman
was the maintenance of order at a state supported and operated institution.
The legitimacy of investigations of state agencies and institutions has
long been recognized.49 Neither court specifically stated the existence of
,' See notes 7 & 8 sitpra. The argument has been advanced that the courts
have abstained in order to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions. Normally a
federal court will not rule on the constitutionality of a state statute until a state
court has interpreted it. The state court may interpret the statute in such a way that
a constitutional decision is not required. "However, in the free speech area,
vagueness, the very ambiguity which [normally] justifies abstention, is the uih-
constitutional vice that is the object of the complaint." Note, 1968 Wis. L. Rzv.
587, 591. Thus any reason for abstention on the grounds of avoidance vanishes
with the realization that such abstention will not protect first amendments rights
against the vagueness of the resolution or statute. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1965), where abstention was held to be improper on the grounds that
the very threat of prosecution under vague provisions inhibits the free exercise of
first amendment rights.
8 Compare Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), with Watkins v.
United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957). See also Gibson v. Florida Leg. Inves. Comm'n,
372 U.S. 539, 576 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
" E.g., Dickenson v. Johnson, 117 Ark. 582, 176 S.W. 116 (1915).
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a public-private distinction," but it is possible that a stronger showing of
legitimate legislative purpose will be required, and a stricter test of the
authorizing resolution applied, when the subject of the investigation is
private, rather than public, in character.
judicial reluctance to enjoin legislative investigations will likely remain
the rule. Nevertheless, the recent exceptions can be considered to be
healthy, for they will encourage courts to grant injunctive relief in those
situations where it is appropriate. Possibly Goldman presented just such
an opportunity. The exercise of first amendment rights is fundamental
to academic freedom and the educational process. The mere existence of
a vague and overbroad resolution is likely to discourage the exercise of
these rights. Such an inhibition strikes at the very heart of the academic
community.5 In light of the special danger of great harm, the injunction
sought in Goldman would seem to have been appropriate relief. If the
legislature required further information, an investigation could still be
authorized by a carefully drafted resolution that clearly articulated the
scope and purpose of the investigation and the powers of the committee.
The cases illustrate that high standards of precision and clarity are
required of authorizing resolutions because of the constitutional dangers
posed by legislative investigations. Unfortunately, many investigations
are instigated in the heat of emotion rather than in the light of purposeful
legislative reasoning. Perhaps the heightened possibility that vague and
overbroad resolutions may be enjoined will encourage careful and precise
legislative draftsmanship.
WILLIAM P. AYcocx, II
Contracts-Interpretation of Contracts When There Are No Terms
As to Duration
When a contract, otherwise definite and binding, contains no terms as
to its duration, many attorneys would surmise that the contract would be
" The distinction is recognized in R. CUSHMAN, CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 71-72 (1956).
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities
is almost self-evident ... No field of education is so thoroughly compre-
hended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made .... Scholarship
cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to
gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stag-
nate and die.
Id. at 250.
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terminable only after the lapse of a reasonable time.' In Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Florida East Coast Railway,- however, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a contract containing no express
terms as to its duration was terminable at will by either party upon the
giving of a reasonable notice. The court establishes guidelines that may
be helpful in the analyses of future cases.
In 1917 Southern Bell and F.E.C. entered into a contract that estab-
lished detailed procedures and specifications for the placement of Southern
Bell's telephone and telegraph lines over and under F.E.C.'s tracks. The
agreement called for Southern Bell to submit their plans to F.E.C.'s chief
engineer for approval, thus insuring that the line placement would not in-
terfere with the railroad's operations. Southern Bell paid no money to
F.E.C. for these crossings, although the agreement provided that Southern
Bell would indemnify F.E.C. for any damage caused by the line crossings.
Without the agreement, Southern Bell could still have obtained the right
to cross the railroad by eminent domain procedures ;' however, the con-
tract avoided the need for litigation each time that Southern Bell wished
to cross F.E.C.'s property. The contract proved satisfactory for nearly
fifty years, but in 1965 F.E.C. complained that the rapid expansion in the
number of crossings cast an intolerable burden upon the railroad. F.E.C.
gave notice of termination and refused to abide by the terms of the
agreement.4 Southern Bell brought suit to enforce the contract.
The court found that the intent of the parties as to the duration could
not be gleaned from the terms of the agreement and, therefore, turned to
legal rules and presumptions to aid it in inferring the reasonable intent
of the parties.5 The legal presumption that the court found controlling
'See, e.g., Friedman v. Schleuter, 105 Ark. 580, 151 S.W. 696 (1912) (where
no time fixed for erection of a building, a reasonable time is implied) ; Duke v.
Miller, 355 Mich. 540, 94 N.W.2d 819 (1959) (where contract is silent as to time
for payment, payment must be made within a reasonable time); Walker v. Central
Freight Lines Inc., 382 S.W.2d 125 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (where no time is
fixed for performance, a reasonable time is intended).
399 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1968).
'FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.24 (1964).
' 399 F.2d at 856. Southern Bell admitted that if F.E.C. could terminate the
contract, the notice given was adequate. It should be noted that F.E.C. offered
Southern Bell a new contract similar to those that F.E.C. had with other utility
companies. These contracts provided for payment for the crossings.
In construing a contract, the court will try to ascertain the intent of the parties,
and, if successful, the agreement will be construed to conform to that intent. See, e.g.,
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 129 F. 849 (3d Cir. 1904); Mississippi
River Logging Co. v. Robson, 69 F. 773 (8th Cir. 1895). See also S. WILLISTON,
LAW OF CONTRACTs § 38 (3d ed. 1957) [hereinafter cited as WILLISTON].
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was that the parties to a contract indefinite as to duration intended that
the contract be terminable at will upon giving reasonable notice. The
court noted two exceptions to this presumption: (1) when one party
has relied to its detriment on the agreement or (2) when one party has
fulfilled its part of the bargain without corresponding performance on
the part of the other party.' Since Southern Bell neither alleged nor proved
detrimental reliance on its part and could not bring itself within the excep-
tion of a party who had executed its part of the bargain,7 the court found
that F.E.C. was within its rights in terminating the contract.
Southern Bell sought to have the contract construed as granting it
rights in perpetuity to cross F.E.C.'s land. Although perpetual contracts
are sanctioned in some areas such as real property8 or when there is a
promise not to carry on a business,9 contracts of indefinite duration are
not often interpreted as being perpetual. 10 When interpreting a contract
where the intent of the parties as to the duration cannot be ascertained,
the problem facing the courts is to give the contract a reasonable inter-
pretation. The contract may be construed to conform to what the court
believes the expectations of the parties were at the time the contract was
made.1 It would be difficult to establish a broad general rule that could
1399 F.2d at 859. In City of Gainesville v. Board of Control, 81 So. 2d 514
(Fla. 1955), the city offered to provide free water if the university would locate
in Gainesville. No termination date was set forth and the court held that the city
was obligated to furnish water as long as the university remained in Gainesville.
It should be noted that although two exceptions were set forth to the general rule,
both tend to shade into the central idea of detrimental reliance.
ITo have shown detrimental reliance, Southern Bell would have had to prove
that F.E.C. promised to allow the crossings perpetually and that it (Southern Bell)
changed its position in reliance upon this promise. Southern Bell could not bring
itself within the second exception because, as to the crossings already completed,
both parties had fully executed their parts of the bargain.
' Compare Morton v. Sayles, 304 S.W.2d 759, 763 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957) (where
a restrictive covenant was held "not to run for a reasonable length of time,
but that it is to run forever"), with Normus Realty Corp. v. Gargano, 38 Misc. 2d
408, 237 N.Y.S.2d 648 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (where the court refused to enforce a
restrictive covenant when changed conditions would make the enforcement in-
equitable).
'Hauser v. Harding, 126 N.C. 295, 35 S.E. 586 (1900). But see Maola Ice
Cream Co. v. Maola Milk & Ice Cream Co., 238 N.C. 317, 77 S.E.2d 910 (1953);
Note, Covenants Not to Compete, 38 N.C.L. Rxv. 395 (1960).
'
0 Holt v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 52 F.2d 1068, 1069 (4th Cir. 1931)
... a construction conferring a right in perpetuity will be avoided unless com-
pelled by the unequivocal language of the contract"). See also Freeport Sulphur
Co. v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 206 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1953); Town of Readsboro v.
Hoosac Tunnel, 6 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1925); WILLISTON § 38.
'
1Farnsworth, Disputes Over Omission In Contracts, 68 CoLum. L. Rnv. 860
(1968).
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equitably solve every problem of this nature; and, as a result, the courts
will look in each case at the circumstances surrounding the contract to
determine whether the contract will endure for a reasonable time or be
terminable at will."' It is possible that a court may, in effect, construe
a contract as perpetual by determining that the reasonable time of
duration approaches perpetuity."3 Encountering this problem, where a city
promised to furnish water to a non-resident of the city, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court in Childs v. City of Columbia4 held:
[I]t would be unreasonable to impute to the parties an intention to
make a contract binding themselves perpetually. In such a case the
courts hold with practical unanimity that the only reasonable intention
that can be imputed to the parties is that the contract may be ter-
minated by either, on giving reasonable notice of his intention to the
other.15
The court did not discuss its reasoning, but if in a setting where conditions
will obviously change, the parties do not expressly provide that the contract
is to endure perpetually, it is reasonable to assume that the parties con-
sidered and rejected this provision.
The reasoning applied to the problem in Southern Bell is evident in
other types of contracts. One area in which the problem of indefinite
duration often arises is the employment contract. Although the law is
somewhat unsettled in this area,1 courts have generally interpreted the
employment contract of indefinite duration to be terminable at the will
of either party.'7 Where the compensation for personal services is pro-
portionate to a unit of time, the agreements have often been interpreted
to be terminable only after the lapse of this period,' 8 although some courts
2 See, e.g., Mitler v. Friedeberg, 32 Misc. 2d 78, 222 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Sup.
Ct. 1961).
" City of Gainesville v. Board of Control, 81 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1955).
1'87 S.C. 566, 70 S.E. 296 (1911).
Ir Id. at 572, 70 S.E. at 298.
" See Note, Employment Contracts of Unspecified Duration, 42 CoLuM. L.
REv. 107 (1942).
" Willcox & Gibbs Sewing Mach. Co. v. Ewing, 141 U.S. 627 (1891); Seneca
Falls Mach. Co. v. McBeth, 368 F.2d 915 (3d Cir. 1966); WILLISTON § 39; Note,
15 N.C.L. REv. 276 (1937). Compare Warden v. Hinds, 163 F. 201 (4th Cir.
1908) (contract terminable at will without notice), with Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.
v. Andrews, 211 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1954) (contract terminable at will but only
upon giving reasonable notice).
"
8 RESTATEMENT OF CoNTRAcTs § 32 (1932); WILLISTON § 39; Comment,
Contracts-Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts That Specify Period of
Pay, 48 MicH. L. REv. 80 (1949).
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merely consider this as one factor to be weighed in the determination.1"
However, when an employee has relied to his detriment upon a promise
of employment" or when the employee has wholly executed his part of
the bargain,21 the courts have not interpreted the contract as being
terminable at will.
Employment contracts are not entirely adequate precedent for a broad
application of the presumption employed in Southern Bell, however, due
to the thirteenth amendment's proscription of involuntary servitude and
the courts' traditional refusal to specifically enforce such agreements.22
A second area in which the problem of a contract of indefinite dura-
tion arises is the franchise or exclusive sales agency contract. The parties
to the franchise contract can frequently bring themselves within the first
exception to the general rule by showing detrimental reliance since these
agreements often involve a large investment and expense to the distributor,
and the courts, therefore, are hesitant to allow the parties to terminate the
agreement at will. Some courts interpret the agreement to be enforceable
for a reasonable time, indicating that the contract does not endure until
the distributor has recouped his expenditures but only until he has had
a fair opportunity to do so. 23 When the agreement is a "sales distribu-
tion" agreement, combining the features of an employment contract and a
sales agency contract, courts have held that the agreement is terminable
only after a reasonable time has elapsed and then only upon the giving
of a reasonable notice.24
"
9See, e.g., McCall v. Oldenburg, 382 S.W.2d 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1964). See
also Note, 24 TENN. L. REV. 1188 (1957).
" Riefkin v. E.I. dupont De Nemours & Co., 53 App. D.C. 311, 290 F. 286
(D.C. Cir. 1923) (relinquishment of a position in reliance of employment; the em-
ployment is to last as long as the employer remains in business) ; cf. Hicks v. Free-
man, 397 F.2d 193 (4th Cir. 1968) (the only detriment was the lessening of skills
due to passage of time; therefore, the contract was terminable at will).21 See, e.g., Cary v. U.S. Hoffman Mach. Corp., 148 F. Supp. 748 (D.D.C. 1957).
" Kadis v. Britt, 224 N.C. 154, 29 S.E.2d 543 (1944) ; see Stevens, Involuntary
Servitude by Injunction, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 235 (1921).
" General Tire & Rubber Co. v. Distributors, Inc., 253 N.C. 459, 117 S.E.2d
479 (1960); Gelhorn, Limitations on Contract Termination Rights-Franchise
Cancellations, 1967 DUKE L.J. 465, 478-83; Note, 40 N.C.L. REV. 804 (1962).
Contra, Sanchez v. Crandon Wholesale Drug Co., 167 So. 2d 640 (Fla. Ct. App.
1964). In Sanchez both parties admitted that the agreement was terminable at
will. The agent was not allowed to recoup his expenditures because he could not
prove detrimental reliance. The court stated that reliance in the legal sense was
presented where one party justifiably relied upon a certain set of facts only to have
those facts change to his detriment. Here the facts did not change.2
,J.C. Millett Co. v. Park & Tilford Dist. Corp., 123 F. Supp. 484 (N.D. Cal.
1954) ; C.C. Hauff Hardware, Inc. v. Long Mfg. Co., 257 Iowa 1127, 136 N.W.2d
276 (1965).
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In a commercial setting where economic conditions often change
rapidly and unexpectedly, to interpret all contracts that are indefinite as
to duration as binding in perpetuity would result in inequities to the
parties. On the other hand, to interpret all contracts that are indefinite
as to duration as terminable at will would lead to uncertainty and perhaps
defeat the clear intent of the contracting parties. It would be a rare case
in which the parties intended to make a contract that could be terminated
within one day or one week. A third approach would be to construe the
contract as enduring for a reasonable time. This approach would lend
a degree of certainty to the contract, yet would allow sufficient flexibility
to avoid unpredictable and inequitable consequences. In fact, the court
in Southern Bell may have implicitly adopted this approach and con-
cluded that a reasonable time had elapsed, since the contract had endured
for nearly fifty years. The court was certainly justified in placing the
burden upon the contracting parties to make the terms of duration explicit
in the contract if they intended it to endure in perpetuity. When the
parties failed to manifest such an intent and when one party could not
show detrimental reliance, the court logically interpreted the contract as
terminable at will upon giving reasonable notice.
MICKEY A. HERRIN
Federal Courts-The "Erie Doctrine" and Tolling of the
State Statute of Limitation
Thus perhaps we can conclude that under the Constitution only Penn-
sylvania can say what tort duties are imposed on Pennsylvania land-
owners, that under the Constitution only the federal government can
say how the federal courts are to administer their proceedings, and
that under the Constitution it is a difficult and doubtful question whether
New York or the federal government should have the right to deter-
mine how promptly a suit must be brought in federal court to vindicate
a right created by the state.'
The "difficult and doubtful question" posed by Professor Wright came
into issue recently in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in the case of Atkins v. Schmutz Manufacturing Co.,' where an
1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 56, at 198 (1963).
401 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1968) (petition for rehearing en bane has been granted,
limited to the issue of whether either state or federal equitable remedies may be
available to plaintiff).
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injured worker became enmeshed in a "procedural booby trap" upon
attempting to sue the manufacturer of the machine that injured him.
This note will consider the methods available to extricate plaintiff from
such a trap, and will examine the rationale of the court of appeals in
denying him a trial on the merits.
Plaintiff was injured on June 22, 1961, in Virginia, when he became
entangled in a machine manufactured and sold by defendant; the accident
necessitated the amputation of both feet. Defendant's only place of
business was in Kentucky, and since Virginia then had no "long-arm"
statute,4 plaintiff reasonably elected to sue defendant in a Kentucky
federal court. Suit was brought on June 19, 1963-after the one-year
Kentucky statute of limitations5 had elapsed, but three days before the
two-year Virginia statute6 expired. At that time, however, Kentucky
law, as understood in the federal courts, permitted a foreign state's
statute of limitations to govern a cause of action arising in that state,
where the foreign statute of limitations allowed a longer period in which
to bring the action.7 Plaintiff's procedural problems began when the
Kentucky Court of Appeals announced, while his case was pending in
a Kentucky federal court, that in such cases the Kentucky statute would
prevail,8 and that this rule applied retroactively.' Defendant's motion for
summary judgment was granted, the judgment was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,'" and certiorari denied by the
United States Supreme Court." An action in a Virginia federal court
followed, and that court also granted summary judgment for defendant,
finding that the action pending in the Kentucky court had not tolled the
two-year Virginia statute of limitations.' 2 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit affirmed,'- with Judge Craven dissenting. The decision
to deny relief to the plaintiff merits close scrutiny.
'Id. at 735 (Craven, J., dissenting).
'Such a statute has since been enacted. VA. CoDE ANN. § 8-81.2 (Cum. Supp.
1968).
'Ky. REv. STAT. § 413.140 (1942).
'VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24 (1957).
"See, e.g., Collins v. Clayton & Lambert Mfg. Co., 299 F.2d 362 (6th Cir.
1962) ; Koeppe v. Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co., 250 F.2d 270 (6th Cir. 1957) ; Burton
v. Miller, 185 F.2d 817 (6th Cir. 1950).
8 Seat v. Eastern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 389 S.W.2d 908 (Ky. 1965).
" Wethington v. Griggs, 392 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1965).
"
0Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 372 F.2d 762 (6th Cir. 1967).
"Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 389 U.S. 829 (1967).
"
2Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 268 F. Supp. 406 (W.D. Va. 1967).
"Atkins v. Schmutz Mfg. Co., 401 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1968).
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What in existing law required such a severe result? The court of
appeals relied on a Virginia statute,14 which enumerates the instances in
which a statute of limitations is suspended, and cited a Virginia case, 5
which in another situation had strictly construed that statute. The court
found that had the action been brought in a state court, the statute of
limitations would not have been tolled, and applying what the court
perceived to be the principle of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins,'( a majority of
the three-judge court held that they were bound to this construction, citing
as additional authority Guaranty Trust Co. v. York." Judge Craven
did not agree. In a scholarly and well-reasoned dissent, he presented a
forceful argument that the "Erie Doctrine" did not forbid granting plain-
tiff a trial on the merits, and expressed doubt as to the continuing vitality
of Guaranty itself. The dissent raises issues long assumed to have been
settled, but worthy of reconsideration.
It is helpful to begin with a summary history, familiar to every first-
year law student, of the "Erie Doctrine." Traditionally, the Rules of
Decision Act' has required federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction
to apply the laws of the states; Swift v. Tyson,'" however, held that the
language of the Act referred only to statutory law, and that the decisions
of state courts were not binding on the federal judiciary, even though the
substantive rights were state-created. This pattern prevailed until 1938,
when the Supreme Court in Erie overturned nearly a century of precedent
and held that state decisional law was henceforth to be weighted equally
with state statutory law by federal courts exercising diversity jurisdic-
tion. This was followed in 1941 by Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric
Manufacturing Co.,20 which significantly extended the Erie principle
to require a federal court to adopt the conflict of laws rule of the state
in which it sits. Then came a startling development in 1945, when the
Court held in Guaranty that a federal court, being "only another court
of the state,"'" was to apply state law whenever necessary to insure that
the "outcome" of the litigation would be the same as if the action had been
brought in a state court ;22 thus a state statute that required the same
" VA. CODE AN. §§ 8-30 to -34 (1957).
" Jones v. Morris Plan Bank, 170 Va. 88, 195 S.E. 525 (1938).
18304 U.S. 64 (1938).
" 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
1828 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964).
1941 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
'313 U.S. 487 (1941).
21326 U.S. at 108.
."Id. at 109.
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statute of limitations at law and in equity was accepted as controlling.
The "intent" of Erie was declared to require this "outcome-determinative"
test, and the case was cited for that proposition.2 Subsequent cases
hastened, on authority of what became known as the "Erie Doctrine," to
apply state law to a variety of problems, many of which had traditionally
been denominated "procedural" in other contexts, until it seemed likely
that even the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would succumb to "out-
come-determinative" analysis. 24
The theory was weakened, however, in 1958, when the Supreme Court
decided in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.2 ' that
even where the outcome could arguably be determined by choice of the
federal rule, that rule would prevail if there were a strong federal policy
in favor of its application compared to a relatively weak state interest
in the state law. There the strong federal policy favoring jury trials
expressed in the seventh amendment was found to outweigh a state rule
requiring judges to determine factual issues in workmen's compensation
proceedings. In 1965, another partial refutation of the earlier post-Erie
cases was announced in Hanna v. Plumer;2' Federal Rule 4(d) (1),27
describing the federal manner of service of process, was held to prevail
over a Massachusetts rule that demanded in-hand service. Though the
same result could have been reached in conformity to the post-Erie cases,
the decision is significant for the breadth of its language, which impliedly
shielded the entire Federal Rules of Civil Procedure against potential
Erie attacks. Moreover, Hanna arguably overruled Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer Co.,28 which had held that Federal Rule 3,20 providing that the
filing of a complaint commences an action in federal court, yielded to a
local rule that deemed an action commenced by service of process. The
distinction was crucial, for between filing of the complaint and service of
process the statute of limitations had run.
It should be noted that though the Erie decision purported to rest
on constitutional grounds, no specific portion of the Constitution was
23 Id.
"See, e.g., Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A Triple Play on the Federal
Rules, 3 VAND. L. Rav. 711 (1950); Note, The Erie Case and the Federal Rules-
A Prediction, 39 GEo. L.J. 600 (1951); Clark, Book Review, 36 CORNELL L.Q.
181 (1950).
25356 U.S. 525 (1958).
"380 U.S. 460 (1965).
.F R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1).
"337 U.S. 530 (1949).
Fm. R. Civ. P. 3.
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mentioned in Justice Brandeis' majority opinion, and the existence vel non
of a constitutional basis for Erie has been a topic widely debated by
legal scholars.3 0 Regardless of the obscurity of Erie's precise constitu-
tional basis, however, it can reasonably claim some inherent foundation
in the spirit of that document, if not its letter, for it echoes a fundamental
tenet of federalism. The rigid determinism of Guaranty, on the other
hand, is clearly without any such constitutional compulsion, innate or
explicit.
Further, it is at least arguable that the Rules of Decision Act does not
require extension to the extreme reached in Guaranty and its progeny.
That statute provides that the "laws of the several states" are to be "rules
of decision" in the federal courts, with two exceptions: (1) except where
the federal Constitution or federal statutes "otherwise require or provide,"
and (2) only "in cases where they apply.""1 Under the first exception,
a possible argument is that article III and the diversity statute determine
what causes will be heard by the federal courts, and presumably require
federal procedure to administer them. But such statutes merely grant
the court jurisdiction, not require it,32 as is recognized in the abstention
doctrine.33 As to the second exception, arguably the only "cases" where
the state rules apply are cases involving substantive issues, and a state
procedural rule, being directed by its very terms to the state courts, is
simply not applicable in a federal court. This, obviously, is only the old
"substance-procedure" dichotomy in another form."4
The oft-cited "Erie Doctrine" is thus only remotely based on the
Erie holding. Technically, that decision merely clarified and enlarged
slightly the words of the Rules of Decision Act. Actually, it was the
subsequent line of decisions-Klaxon, Guaranty, Ragan, Angel v. Bulling-
ton, 5 and others-that formed the basis of the "Erie Doctrine" as it is
" Compare Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipres-
ence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946), with Hart, The Relations
Between State and Federal Law, 54 CoLum. L. REv. 489 (1954), and Smith,
Blue Ridge and Beyond: A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litiga-
tion, 36 TUL. L. REv. 443 (1962).
3128 U.S.C. § 1652 (1964).
" Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). But cf. Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328-30 (1816).
"See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm'n
v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315(1943); Railroad Conun'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
" Cf. Meador, State Law and the Federal Judicial Power, 49 VA. L. Rnv. 1082(1963).
"330 U.S. 183 (1947).
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commonly known today, modified by Byrd and Hanna. These post-Erie
cases seemed to require that federal courts "mirror," as closely as
possible, the state courts, and that state rules, no matter how "procedural"
for other purposes, were to govern the federal courts if the outcome of
the litigation hinged on their application. Justice Rutledge, dissenting
in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp.,86 was persuaded that the
courts had misapplied the Erie principle:
But the Erie case made no ruling that in so deciding diversity cases
a federal court is "merely another court of the state in which it sits,"
and hence that in every situation in which the doors of state courts
are closed to a suitor, so must be also those of the federal courts. Not
only is this not true when the state bar is raised by a purely procedural
obstacle. There is sound historical reason for believing that one of the
purposes of the diversity clause was to afford a federal court remedy
when, for at least some reasons of state policy, none would be available
in the state courts3 7
If, as suggested by the absence of other bases, the Guaranty doc-
trine rests only in judicial policy, then of course it may be altered by
judges. A reconsideration by the courts of the function and purpose of
diversity jurisdiction in a federal system is desirable. It was said in
Byrd that "[t]he federal system is an independent system for admin-
istering justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction,""8 and
that "state laws cannot alter the essential character or function of a
federal court." 9 If only the Guaranty line of decisions were controlling,
that "essential character or function" would be limited to providing a
forum distinguishable from its neighboring state courts only in the most
minimal detail. But is this the reason for which diversity jurisdiction
finds a place in the Constitution? Is it not the function of the federal
courts to insure diverse litigants a "juster justice,"4 0 perhaps even to
set an example by the enlightened use of judicial power? Or, as put by
Professors Hart and Wechsler: "Once we conclude that the summurn
bonum of diversity litigation is a federal court which perfectly mirrors the
courts of the state in which it is sitting, is it possible to attribute any
rational purpose to the diversity clause?'"41 It is necessary to remember
" 337 U.S. 541, 557 (1949).
ST Id. at 558.38 356 U.S. at 537.
" Id. at 539, quoting Herron v. Southern Pac. Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94 (1931).
"'The phrase is borrowed from H. M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEm 652 (1953).
4"1Id. at 635.
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that Erie alone does not confine the federal judges to the "role of the
ventriloquist's dummy" ;42 that interpretation stems from post-Erie cases
that have misapplied it, and that are themselves grounded neither in the
Constitution nor in congressional command. It is unlikely that federalism
is better served by requiring federal courts to assist state courts in deny-
ing a remedy for a prima facie substantive right-itself state-created-
particularly, as in Atkins, when it is far from clear that the state court
itself would have denied its citizen a remedy against a foreign defendant.
Aversion to "forum-shopping" alone cannot be the answer, for un-
disputedly "procedural" considerations frequently influence choice of
forum, as where an attorney prefers the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to an antiquated state code, or believes he will find better-trained judges,
or is motivated by a difference in jury selection procedures. Further, if
"forum-shopping" is the ogre it is represented to be, why is it more of
one as between adjacent state and federal courts, yet excusable among
geographical areas within the federal court system ?
If the above analyses of policy and precedent be reasonably accurate,
then, as Judge Craven put it, there is "room for doubt"4 whether the
majority in Atkins was correct in disposing of plaintiff's problem by
summarily citing Erie and Guaranty and proceeding to infer what the
Virginia court would do when confronted by a situation it had never
encountered. This is far removed from any result compelled by Erie
alone, and it ignores the modification of the Guaranty doctrine in Byrd
and Hanna, which, it would seem, deserved at least parenthetical men-
tion. Judge Craven, reluctantly conceding for purposes of argument the
validity of Guaranty, pointed out that plaintiff's remedy-trial on the
merits--could still have been granted him without resorting to an Erie
analysis. The facts peculiar to plaintiff's situation suggest several alterna-
tive bases for relief.
By clever use of the federal transfer statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (1964),
," Richardson v. Commissioner, 126 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1942) (quoted by
Judge Craven in Atkins, 401 F.2d at 735).
'" C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, § 58, at 205, gives another example of the double-
edged nature of the forum-shopping argument:
Unless some freedom is vouchsafed the federal judge, the Erie doctrine will
simply have substituted one kind of forum-shopping for another. The lawyer
whose case is dependent on an old or shaky state court decision which
might no longer be followed within the state, will have strong incentive to
maneuver the case into federal court, where, on the mechanical jurisprudence
which the Erie doctrine was once thought to require, the state decision can-
not be impeached.
"401 F.2d at 735.
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Judge Craven illustrated how the entire problem could have been avoided
when it became apparent that relief could not be obtained in the Kentucky
federal courts. When the one-year statute of limitations was held to
prevail over the Virginia statute, plaintiff was then in a "wrong" judicial
district within the meaning of § 1406, and could have transferred to
the Virginia district court without the statute of limitations of either
state barring his claim. 5 Thus, trial on the merits could have been had
even though the state statute of limitations had run, through the purely
mechanical method of operation of the federal courts, which is undoubtedly
not a matter of state regulation. The significance of this route's avail-
ability is to demonstrate how "procedural" the problem really is; for what
considerations of policy require the statute to be a bar in the Atkins
situation, but allow its tolling through invocation of the right technical
devices ?
The problem could also have been resolved within the confines of the
post-Erie doctrine. Byrd held that where a strong federal policy competes
with a weak state policy, the federal rule prevails. It is especially ironic
that by paying lip service through Erie to state law and policy, the
majority in Atkins becomes subject to the same criticism that brought
about the demise of Swift v. Tyson-discrimination in favor of non-
residents against residents. "The essence of diversity jurisdiction," said
Justice Frankfurter in Angel, "is that a federal court enforces State law
and State policy."4 6 It is beyond belief that one could seriously impute
to Virginia a policy that would allow a foreign corporation to mangle
one of its citizens within the borders of that state and leave him without
a remedy. The recently-enacted "long-arm" statute,47 in fact, suggests
just the opposite. And if there is a strong federal and a strong state
interest in the same result-trial on the merits-then the Byrd "balancing"
test would seem to demand that result. As to the policy behind applica-
tion of the statute of limitations, that, too, is hardly controlling, for where
there is an identical action involving the same parties pending in another
court, there is little danger of stale claims based on obscure evidence and
fact. This argument is particularly appealing in the instant case, where
extensive discovery was under way prior to dismissal of the Kentucky
action.48
" Cf. Goldllawr v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463 (1962).
'6330 U.S. at 191.
"VA. CODF, ANN. § 8-81.2 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
Brief for Appellant at 7, Appendix for Appellant at 21-25, Atkins v. Schmutz
Mfg. Co., 401 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1968).
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The defendant in Atkins, by confining its jurisdictional "presence"
to a state that allowed assertion of remedies within only a very short
time was permitted, in effect, to defeat both the right and the remedy
created by the plaintiff's state. A persuasive case could be made, as
Justice Rutledge pointed out in Guaranty, that the diversity clause was
inserted to afford protection against exactly this form of abuse of state
sovereignty. 49
If the result in Atkins was required neither by Erie, nor by the Con-
stitution, nor by congressional mandate, nor even by post-Erie case law,
and if the relevant policy considerations militate against it, then why did
the court of appeals feel constrained to deny plaintiff relief, particularly
when, as the court itself admitted, the "equities" of the case "strongly
favor[ed]" him?" The answer can be found in the confusion prevalent
among the lower federal courts as to the proper scope of the Erie prin-
ciple. Perhaps the injustice done Donald Atkins in the name of this
doctrine will serve as a catalyst for resolution of the conflict. Certainly,
Byrd and Hanna are evidence of growing dissatisfaction with the mecha-
nistic application of "outcome-determination," and it is arguable that they
foreshadow a trend towards dignifying the role of the federal court in
diversity litigation, perhaps even by directly overruling Guaranty and
the brood it has spawned. An appealing solution is that suggested by
Justice Harlan, concurring in Hanna:
To my mind the proper line of approach in determining whether to
apply a state or a federal rule, whether "substantive" or "procedural,"
is to stay close to basic principles 'by inquiring if the choice of rule
would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human
conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation. 5'
C. FRANK GOLDSMITH, JR.
Wills-Ghosts in North Carolina-The Haunting rrobleni of the
After-Discovered Will
Given a death in North Carolina, a will or intestate administration
will normally follow fairly quickly, enabling all concerned to get their
4°326 U.S. at 118-19.
80401 F.2d at 733-34.
380 U.S. at 475. See H. M. HART & H. WEcHSLER, supra note 40. Cf. Angel
v. Bullington, 150 F.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1945) (opinion of Dobie, J.), rei'd, 330 U.S.
183 (1947).
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fair'allotment from the estate. In the majority of cases distribution ends
the matter, and there are no further problems. Suppose, however, that
75 years after a proper administration and distribution under the intestacy
laws a distant relative finds what he alleges to be decedent's will and pro-
cedes to probate it? On appeal the question arises: May a will be probated
in North Carolina after such a long period of time has elapsed? The
answer is indisputably, "yes."1 This note will explore whether this result
is desirable and consonant with current North Carolina policy on will
probate.
At common law there was no statute of limitations on the original
probate of a will,' and neither the general statute of limitations8 nor the
registration statutes4 were held applicable to original probate. Today,
however, many states have statutes of limitation on the original probate
of a will that run in length from sixth months8 to five years.' North Caro-
lina, however, continues to follow the common law doctrine.
North Carolina does impose some indirect limits upon probate. A
nuncupative will may not be probated more than six months after being
uttered by the decedent unless it is reduced to writing within ten days
from the date of death. An action to caveat a will must be instituted
within three years or be barred completely.8 Probate of a second will
has been barred in North Carolina by the doctrines of laches and
estoppel.10 It has also been held that one who has or knows of a will
-In re Thompson, 178 N.C. 540, 101 S.E. 107 (1919).
'it re Dupree, 163 N.C. 256, 79 S.E. 611 (1913); Boggan v. Somers, 152 N.C.
390, 67 S.E. 965 (1910) ; Steadman v. Steadman, 143 N.C. 345, 55 S.E. 784 (1906).
See also 1 N. WIGGINS, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES IN NORTH CARO-
LINA § 112 (1964).
' Ricks v. Wilson, 154 N.C. 282, 70 S.E. 476 (1911); McCormick v. Jernigan,
110 N.C. 406, 14 S.E. 971 (1892).
'Barnhardt v. Morrison, 178 N.C. 563, 101 S.E. 218 (1919); Harris v. Dudley
Lumber Co., 147 N.C. 631, 61 S.E. 604 (1908); Bell v. Couch, 132 N.C. 346, 43
S.E. 911 (1903).
'In re Elliot, 22 Wash. 2d 334, 156 P.2d 427 (1945).
Sims v. Schavey, 234 Ark. 166, 351 S.W.2d 145 (1961). See L. SIMES, MODEL
PROBATE CODE § 83 (1946).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-18.3 (1966). It is arguable that the only purpose of the
time limitation on probate is to insure that the will is accurately set down by
the witnesses. In re Haygood, 101 N.C. 574, 8 S.E. 222 (1888).
8 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-32 (1966).
'Stelges v. Simmons, 170 N.C. 42, 86 S.E. 801 (1915). See also Hayes v.
Simmons, 136 Okla. 206, 277 P. 213 (1928).
10 Stelges v. Simmons, 170 N.C. 42, 86 S.E. 801 (1915). See also Dowd v.
Dowd, 621 Idaho 631, 115 P.2d 409 (1941); In re Stoball, 211 Miss. 15, 50 So. 2d
635 (1951).
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has a positive duty to probate it," and if he fraudulently suppresses
it, he can be criminally prosecuted.'" The executor has a similar duty to
probate the will,' 3 and if the Clerk of Superior Court knows of the
suppression, he may compel production.'4 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-12 and
§ 31-1515 taken together imply that probate of the will is required,'6
although the statutes do not place a time limit on the requirement.
In North Carolina to probate a second will discovered after the
probate of the first, it is necessary to caveat the first.' The reasoning is
threefold: first, in order for the probate of a will to be conclusive it must
be determined to be the last valid will executed by the decedent. If a
second will may be probated while a first is "still on the books," then
the basic premise has been violated, for there is no more a single set of
directions from the testator. Second, allowing probate of a second will
leads to a multiplicity of actions.'" Finally, the probate judgment has
been likened to the civil judgment, which, when rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction, cannot be collaterally attacked.'"
The North Carolina caveat statute2° sets out two basic provisions
regarding time limits on probate: the caveat action must be brought within
three years of the probate of the will or it is finally and conclusively
barred, and persons under certain named disabilities do not fall within
the limitation until the disability is removed.2' Thus, if a will was
probated in North Carolina and ten years later a subsequent will was
found, the second will could not be probated because such probate would
be a collateral atack. Nor could the first will be caveated, as more than
"
1Wells v. Odum, 205 N.C. 110, 170 S.E. 145 (1933).1 Id.; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1447 (1966).
"In re Mark's Will, 259 N.C. 326, 130 S.E.2d 673 (1963).
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-15 (1966).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 31-12, -15 (1966).
1 Wells v. Odum, 207 N.C. 226, 176 S.E. 563 (1934).
" Powell v. Watkins, 172 N.C. 244, 90 S.E. 207 (1916); see also N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 31-19 (1966). The North Carolina court views probate of a second will
without caveat of the first as a collateral attack and expressly disapproves of it.
It re Puett, 229 N.C. 8, 47 S.E.2d 488 (1948).
8 After the action to probate the second will would follow an action to deter-
mine which will was valid, followed by a series of actions to quiet title in the
various parcels of land involved. Conzet v. Hibbon, 272 Ill. 508, 112 N.E. 305(1916).
"Springs v. Springs, 182 N.C. 484, 107 S.E. 839 (1921); contra, Schultz v.
Schultz, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 358 (1853).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-32 (1966).
"Note that coverture is not a disability. In re Witherington, 186 N.C. 152,
119 S.E. 11 (1923).
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three years would have passed before the finding of the will. However,
if there were a one year old child interested in the estate at the time of
the probate of the first will, caveat to the first would be allowed.22 In
contrast to the time limitations put on probate of a second will, the probate
of a will subsequent to an intestacy is subject to almost no limits, 28 as it is
by definition an original probate.24
The detrimental effects of imposing few or no limitations on probate
of a will in this context may be most readily seen by an examination of
the potential liabilities of distributees, who take by intestacy; of devisees
and legatees, 25 who take by will; and of the transferees of the legatees.
In the case of a distributee of real property,20 it is established that if
he has the property he is liable for the return of it to its newly established
owner.2 7 Likewise, a distributee of personal property28 is liable to a subse-
quent and rightful owner for the return of the property in specie if it is
in the former's possession.29
The more difficult case occurs in the situation where the distributee
no longer has the property in specie, but has sold it to someone from
whom the rightful owner may not recover.30 Though not completely clear,
it appears that the new owner may claim the proceeds from the original
2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-32 (1966). He would have 23 years from the date of
probate. Probate of the second will would be just as incorrect here as it was in
the former situation.
" There are some limits on probate after an intestacy. See cases and statutes
cited notes 7-16 supra.
2 See cases cited note 2 supra.
2 For the remainder of this note the single term "distributee" will be used to
denote any party taking under a will or an intestate administration.2 Title vests in the heirs at the date of death subject to divestment by later will.
Hargrave v. Gardner, 264 N.C. 117, 141 S.E.2d 36 (1965). Title vests in the de-
visee at the date of probate but relates back to the testator's date of death. Steadman
v. Steadman, 143 N.C. 345, 55 S.E. 784 (1906).
"In re Walker's Estate, 160 Cal. 547, 117 P. 510 (1911); Cousens v. Advent
'Church, 93 Me. 292, 45 A. 43 (1899).
8 It is an interesting question as to who has title to personal property if there
is no administration, but only a family settlement. An equally interesting solution
is offered by Brobst v. Brobst, 190 Mich. 63, 155 N.W. 734 (1916), holding that
only the legal title vests in the personal representative, if there is one. The equitable
title vests at death in the distributee. If there is an administration, the distributee
gets both legal and equitable title. If there is no administration, but a family
settlement, the distributee gets no legal title but is estopped to deny the title of
others. See also cases cited note 26 supra. Real and personal property are treated
similarly in this instance.
2 InreWest, 2 Ch. 180 (1909).
20 Rights of a subsequent distributee, legatee, or devisee as against the purchaser
for value will be discussed infra at pages 727-29.
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beneficiary."1 The best authority for this proposition in North Carolina is
Whitehurst v. Hinton,2 where, after a successful caveat of the will ifn-
volved, the referee, and subsequently the trial judge, held that since the
property in question had been sold, the proceeds from the sale could be
followed into the hands of the original devisees. The North Carolina
Supreme Court did not directly decide the issue; however, by affirming
the decision of the trial court, the decision as to the proceeds was affirmed
by implication.-
The original distributee is thus subject to almost strict liability
either for the return of the property in specie or for the return of its
proceeds. Consider the case where a man has inherited property, builds
a substantial home upon it, and then awakens twenty years later to find
himself dispossessed by a devisee under a newly discovered will. Even
though he may recover for the fair market value of the improvements,"
the likelihood of his recovering either the cost or their real value to him
is miniscule. Other similar situations are not hard to imagine. Obviously
an indiscriminate and indefinite statute of limitations on original probate
is not desirable from the standpoint of those who inherited from the
original intestacy or will.
The other individual who can be harmed by the probate of a second
will, or a like action, is the bona fide purchaser 5 from the distributee.
Until 191536 North Carolina did not have a statute protecting the innocent
purchaser, and as a result, in at least two decisions, the bona fide pur-
chaser was held not to be protected. 7 The theory of these cases was
that the title acquired by the subsequent distributee related back3" to the
date of death of the decedent; therefore, the original distributee had
" See Thompson v. Samson, 64 Cal. 330, 30 P. 980 (1883); In re West, 2 Ch.
180 (1909).
"209 N.C. 392, 184 S.E. 66 (1936).
The opinion must be read to be believed. The holding of the referee may be
found at 209 N.C. 392, 399, 184 S.E. 66, 70 (1936) (holding number six) and that
of the trial judge at 209 N.C. 392, 401, 184 S.E. 66, 71 (1936). See also Gray v.
Goddard, 90 Conn. 561, 98 A. 126 (1916); Palmer, Restitution of Distributiols by
a Fiduciary to Which the Recipient Was Not Entitled, 19 HASTINGS L. REV. 993
(1968); Comment, Wills-Executors and Administrators, 36 MIcn. L. REV. 120(1937).
"The remedial theory is quantum meruit.
"A bona fide purchaser may be defined as "[a] purchaser in good faith for
valuable consideration and without notice." BLAcK's LAW DiCrIONARy 224 (Revw
4th ed. 1968).
"See Bamhardt v. Morrison, 178 N.C. 563, 101 S.E. 218 (1919).
•Id.; Cooley v. Lee, 170 N.C. 18, 86 S.E. 720 (1915).
"Steadman v. Steadman, 143 N.C. 345, 55 S.E. 784 (1906).
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no title to pass. Since the grantee never had title, whether the subsequent
purchasers were bona fide became moot 9 and made alienation of property
a "trap for the unwary."4
Bona fide purchasers are now protected by two North Carolina
statutes.41 Both purport to extend coverage to the purchaser for value
and without notice.42 Both provide that a purchase from a distributee
by an innocent purchaser for value without notice is protected after more
than two years from the date of death of the decedent.4" A purchase is
also protected, even if made within two years, if not challenged until the
period has elapsed.44
It would appear that a two year "wall" is erected by the statutes
between the innocent purchaser and the subsequent distributee. This
result does not necessarily follow, however. For instance, if one buys
property from a distributee of a nonresident decedent, safety from attack
is not guaranteed until five years from the date of death of the decedent.45
In addition, both statutes seem to be directed toward real property only.4"
If a legatee of 100 shares of stock sold the same two years after the
testator's date of death to a bona fide purchaser, who in turn immediately
sold the stock on the market, making it untraceable, will not the bona
fide purchaser be liable to a legatee of the same stock under a subsequent
will? Under the North Carolina statutes it would seem that the pur-
39Id.
Matthews v. Fuller, 209 Md. 42, 120 A.2d 356 (1956).
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28-83 (1966) [hereinafter cited as section 28-83]; N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 31-39 (1966) [hereinafter cited as section 31-39]. The former is con-
cerned with creditors' rights as opposed to those of the bona fide purchaser. The
latter deals with the later probated will and the innocent purchaser.
' Section 28-83 protects the "bona fide purchaser for value and without notice";
section 31-39 protects "innocent purchasers for value," thus seeming to eliminate
the notice requirement.
" Note that section 28-83 also protects a purchase made after the filing of the
final account by the personal representative.
' Section 28-83 and section 31-39.
"Section 28-83 provides in part:
[1]f the decedent was a nonresident, such conveyances shall not be valid
unless made after two years from the grant of letters. But such conveyances
shall be valid, if made five years from the death of a nonresident decedent,
notwithstanding no letters testamentary or letters of administration shall
have been granted.
" Section 28-83 protects "[a]ll conveyances of real property of any decedent
made by any devisee or heir at law.. . ." (emphasis added). Section 31-39 provides
that "the probate and registration of any will shall not affect the rights of innocent
purchasers for value from the heirs at law of the testator . . . ." (This sentence
arguably refers back to a previous one having as its subject "a will devising real
estate.")
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chaser is liable for the price of the stock at the date of its sale by him
since it is personal, and not real, property involved.4 Finally, suppose a
bona fide purchaser bought real property from a devisee more than
two years after the testator's death but before three years from the death.
A second will was then found and used successfully to caveat the first.
Is a bona fide purchaser from the devisee protected by the statute from
the devisee of the second will? The applicable statute' says that "the
probate and registration of any will shall not affect the rights of innocent
purchasers for value from the heirs at law of the testator . . . ."" The
purchase given in the example was not from the heirs at law, but from
the original devisee; therefore, the'statute ° does not protect the bona fide
purchaser. 1
Since it is clear that in certain situations neither the original dis-
tributee of the property nor the innocent purchaser will be protected, there
should be some strong policy to justify such possibly harsh results. In
the case of the bona fide purchaser, problems are caused not so much by
"'But see 3 AMER IcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 14.40 (A. J. Casner ed. 1952)
pointing out that most states have protected the innocent purchaser from the taker
by will. Unfortunately, the two North Carolina cases cited by Mr. Casner as
authority for this proposition concern real property. Whitehurst v. Hinton, 209
N.C. 392, 184 S.E. 66 (1936); Newbern v. Leigh, 184 N.C. 166, 113 S.E. 674
(1922). In Cooley v. Lee, 170 N.C. 18, 86 S.E. 720 (1915) and Barnhardt v.
Morrison, 178 N.C. 563, 101 S.E. 218 (1919), both involving real property, fhe
bona fide purchaser was not protected. These cases were overruled by statute which
did not refer to personal property, and presumably the status of the law relating
to personalty is the same as was that of real property in 1915-19.
," Section 31-39.
It Id. (emphasis added). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-2(3) (1966) defines "heir" as
any person entitled to take real or personal property upon intestacy under the pro-
visions of this chapter." This definition is broader than that of the term "heirs at
law" used in section 31-39. The latter term at common law was defined to mean
persons entitled to inheri' real property. In light of this definitional vacuum there
is a grave doubt whether a bona fide purchaser of personal property is extended
coverage under section 31-39.50 Section 28-83 provides that conveyances by an heir or devisee made within two
years are void as to creditors, executors, administrators, and collectors of the
decedent. If made after two years from the date of death or the filing of the final
account, they are valid, "even as against creditors." Thus as to all parties except
the four named conveyances by an heir or devisee are valid; and those conveyances
made after two years are valid even as against the four classes. If this is a correct
interpretation of the statute, section 28-83 protects a bona fide purchaser from a
devisee of a second will. A better solution would be to amend section 31-39 to cover
this situation.
" It is possible that the bona fide purchaser could be protected by decisional law.
See cases cited note 47 supra. These decisions do not cover personal property,
and also it is arguable that the statute has preempted this area and conclusively
states that only purchases from parties named in the statute will be protected.
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a conclusive state policy limiting protection of the innocent purchaser
as by looseness of statutory language. Much of this could be clarified
by redrafting and possibly combining the two bona fide purchaser statutes.
What seems to be the single justification in North Carolina for the lack
of protection of the original beneficiary is the desire to insure probate
of holographic wills. Because of the sometime secretive nature of the
holographic will, and its penchant for being found in dark comers, an
open statute of limitations for probate seems desirable in order to give the
beneficiaries every chance to find and probate it. The North Carolina
statute controlling holographic wills,"- however, requires that the will must
be found either among the decedent's valuable papers or in some reason-
ably obvious depository. 3 Therefore, it would be the rare case in which a
holographic will is discovered years after the decedent's date of death
and yet qualify under the statute.5 4
In conflict with the above is a strong North Carolina policy favoring
probate, which has been affirmed in numerous statutes and decisions."
The statement of the court in In re Will of Pendergrass5 is demon-
strative: "It is the policy of the law that wills should be probated,
and that the rights of the parties in cases of dispute should be openly
arrived at according to the orderly process of law."57 Behind the desire
to encourage speedy probate is the even more basic policy of the law
to encourage free and unrestricted alienation of property.58
In balance, it is hardly conceivable that the policy favoring holographic
wills could outweigh a strong policy favoring both speedy probate and
free alienation of property, when the effects on the devisee, legatee, dis-
tributee, and the innocent purchaser are taken into account. At the very
least it is clear that the policy behind the law, or lack of it, has weakened
"2 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4(3) (1966).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-3.4(3) (1966). This section provides that the will
must be
[f]ound after the testator's death among his valuable papers or effects, or in
a safe deposit box or other safe place where it was deposited by him or under
his authority, or in the possession or custody of some person with whom, or
some firm or corporation with which, it was deposited by him or under his
authority for safekeeping.
" What constitutes a "valuable paper"? If the phrase is interpreted broadly, then
a will found almost anywhere could be accepted.
Cases and statutes cited notes 6-14 supra.
"251 N.C. 737, 112 S.E.2d 562 (1960).
"Id. at 742, 112 S.E.2d at 566 (quoting Wells v. Odum, 207 N.C. 226, 228, 176
S.E. 563, 564 (1934)).
" Simpson v. Cornish, 196 Wis. 125, 154, 218 N.W. 193, 204 (1928).
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considerably over the years. Moreover, the problem can be readily cured
by adopting a statute of limitations on probate59 and by strengthening the
bona fide purchaser statutes. Given these factors it would seem an appro-
priate time for the legislature to heed the Latin maxim Cessante Ratione
Legis, Cessat Et Ipsa Lex.60
H. IRwiN COFFIELD, III
"Why should the legislature not adopt the five year statute contained in the
MODEL PROBATE CODE? See L. SIMEs, MODEL PROBATE CODE § 83 (1946).
" BLAcK's LAw DIrIONARY 288 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). ("The reason of the law
ceasing, the law itself also ceases.")

